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I. INTRODUCTION

A. Natural and Man-Made DisastersAffecting the United States
Natural and man-made disasters in the United States have been an important
focus of attention within the law and the health care system, particularly since the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the Hurricane Katrina catastrophe four years
later, and more recently the appearance of two novel influenza viruses, 1 one of
which had produced an influenza pandemic by mid-2009. 2
The Joint Commission, the national accreditation agency for health care
organizations, now requires that hospitals consider the impact of a variety of
terrorist events in developing policies, and has substantially revised its emergency
preparedness accreditation standards, which apply to human-made as well as
natural disasters.3 A model statute has been created that would confer specific state
powers during a public health emergency, 4 and many states have introduced or
adopted legislation containing provisions from this statute. 5 The Interstate
Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC), ratified by Congress in

1. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Case Definitions for Infectious Conditions Under
Public Health Surveillance, available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncphi/disss/nndss/casedef/noveI_
influenzaA.htm (defining a "novel" influenza A virus causing human cases of influenza as "[a] virus
subtype that is different from currently circulating human influenza HI and H3 viruses ... [or] HI and
H3 subtypes originating from a non-human species or from genetic reassortment between animal and
human viruses...").
2. Margaret Chan, Director-General, World Health Org., Transcript of Statement by Margaret
Chan, Director-General of the World Health Organization 1 (June 11, 2009), available at
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/influenzaAH INI-presstranscript_20090611 .pdf (updating the status of
novel influenza A (HINI) virus (commonly called "swine flu") infections, declaring that "the scientific
criteria for an influenza pandemic have been met").
3. See generally JOINT COMM'N ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGS., ACCREDITATION
PROGRAM: HOSPITAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT (pre-publ'n ver. 2008) [hereinafter JOINT COMM'N]

(establishing standards for hospital operational plans during emergencies and disasters).
4. MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT § 103 (Ctr. for Law and Pub.'s Health at

Georgetown
and
John
Hopkins
Univs.,
Proposed
Draft
2001),
http://www.publichealthlaw.net/MSEHPA/MSEHPA2.pdf [hereinafter MSEHPA].

available

at

5. See CTR. FOR LAW & PUB.'S HEALTH AT GEORGETOWN & JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVS., THE
MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT: LEGISLATIVE SURVEILLANCE TABLE 1 (2006),

http://www.publichealthlaw.net/MSEHPA/MSEHPA%20Surveillance.pdf (listing the states that have
incorporated aspects of the Model Act).
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1996,6 provides a mechanism for states to supply mutual aid, including, among
other things, license reciprocity or waiver of state licensure, and liability protection
for out-of-state health care providers; 7 to date, all fifty states and four territories
have ratified the Compact.8 Federal initiatives have fostered the creation of local
volunteer provider organizations, such as the Medical Reserve Corps (MRC),
which registers, trains, and would mobilize health care professionals in the event of
a public health emergency or other disaster. 9 As of November 2009, there were
approximately 865 MRC units in the United States and its territories.'0
Under the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and
Response Act of 2002, l1 Congress provided for creation of an Emergency System
for Advance Registration of Health Professional Volunteers (ESAR-VHP), "a
single national interoperable network of systems" to facilitate interstate license
reciprocity and credentialing when out-of-state volunteers wish to provide health
care services during a public health emergency. 12 Finally, the Pandemic and AllHazards Preparedness Act (PAHPA) 13 was enacted in 2006 with the intent of
improving the coordination and management of emergency preparedness and
response, 14 which had been highly criticized by local governments and the public at
large following hurricane Katrina. 5
These efforts and others are intended to build on recent lessons learned, and
hopefully to prevent or solve problems that Americans in the second half of the
twentieth century largely avoided. However, the success of these efforts would
depend on the realities of the health care system, including the adequacy and
availability of supplies and the capabilities and intentions of health care workers.
This Article will focus primarily on the role of physicians, although many

6. Emergency Management Assistance Compact, Pub. L. No. 104-321, 110 Stat. 3877 (1996).

7. Id. § 1, 110 Stat. at 3880.

8. Nat'l Emergency Mgmt. Ass'n, What is EMAC?, http://www.emacweb.org/?9 (last visited
Nov. 25, 2009).
9. Med. Reserve Corps, Office of U.S. Surgeon Gen., http://www.medicalreservecorps.gov/About
(last visited Nov. 25, 2009).
10. Office of U.S. Surgeon Gen., Medical Reserve Corps, http://www.medicalreservecorps.gov/
HomePage (last visited Nov. 25, 2009).
11. Pub. L. No. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594 (2002).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 247d-7b(a) (2006).
13. Pub. L. No. 109-417, 120 Stat. 2831 (2006).
14. See S. REP. No. 109-319, at 1-2 (2006) ("The purpose of [the Act] ... is to improve the
Nation's public health and medical preparedness and response capabilities for emergencies, . . .
[i]mprove[] communication and interoperability, and enhance[] coordination between all levels of
government.").
15. See, e.g., GREG KUTZ & JOHN J. RYAN, U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, HURRICANES
KATRINA AND RITA DISASTER RELIEF: CONTINUED FINDINGS OF FRAUD, WASTE, AND ABUSE (2006),

available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07252t.pdf (criticizing the Federal Emergency
Management Agency's management of the post-Katrina and Rita housing and assistance payments
programs).
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arguments to be addressed may be applied more broadly to others in the health care
field.
B. PotentialforInadequate Health Care Work Force
Although the response of health care workers to the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks and to Hurricane Katrina was robust,1 6 shortage of health care
workers in a disaster is always a concern. Disaster-related damage to infrastructure
or modes of transportation might prevent workers from reaching their place of
employment, 17 or might cut off services or caregivers from their children or
dependent elderly family members. 18 These problems could be at least partly
alleviated by disaster preparedness efforts to strategically redeploy health care
workers throughout the community, or to enlist community volunteers. However, in
a deadly epidemic or similar catastrophe, large portions of the health care work
force might be sick or injured themselves, or too concerned about risk to
themselves to report to work.' 9 For example, in an influenza pandemic, the clinical
disease attack rate is expected to be 20% among working adults and absenteeism
attributable to illness and other pandemic-associated obstacles could rise to 40%
during the peak of a community outbreak. 20 In a survey of U.S. physicians
conducted in 2002, 80% of physicians stated they would be willing to care for
patients during an outbreak of potentially deadly illness, but only 40% stated they
would be willing to risk contracting such a disease to save the life of others.2'
Provider concerns about liability could also pose an obstacle to ensuring a
sufficient pool of personnel. Ventilators and isolation beds are already in short
supply. 22 Overcrowding exists in hospital emergency departments, especially in
metropolitan areas, and bed closures could create crisis conditions in a public

16. James G. Hodge, Jr., Legal Triage During Public Health Emergencies and Disasters, 58
ADMIN. L. REV. 627, 634 (2006).
17. See generally TRANSP. RESEARCH BD., NAT'L Coop. HIGHWAY RESEARCH PROGRAM,
TRANSPORTATION'S ROLE IN EMERGENCY EVACUATION AND REENTRY: A SYNTHESIS OF HIGHWAY
PRACTICE 2 (2009), availableat http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/nchrp/nchrp-syn-392.pdf (noting a
lack of formal planning in many communities for post-emergency reentry of evacuated individuals).

18. See K. Qureshi et al., Health Care Workers' Ability and Willingness to Report to Duty During
CatastrophicDisasters, 82 J. URB. HEALTH 378, 385 (2005) ("[T]he most frequently cited reasons for
not being able to report to work during a catastrophic event were transportation issues, [and] childcare
and elder-care responsibilities .... ") (emphasis in original).
19. G. Caleb Alexander & Matthew K. Wynia, Ready and Willing? Physicians' Sense of
Preparednessfor Bioterrorism, HEALTH AFF., Sept.-Oct. 2003, at 189, 195; Qureshi et al., supra note
18, at 386.
20. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PANDEMIC PLANNING
http://www.flu.gov/professional/pandplan.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2009).

ASSUMPTIONS,

21. Alexander & Wynia, supra note 19, at 192 exhibit 2.
22. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HOSPITAL PREPAREDNESS: MOST URBAN HOSPITALS HAVE
EMERGENCY PLANS BUT LACK CERTAIN CAPACITIES FOR BIOTERRORISM RESPONSE 14-15 (2003),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03924.pdf
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health emergency.23 In New York City, which is highly vulnerable to terrorist
attack, fiscal constraints have led to a reduction in hospital beds and closure of
entire health care institutions. 24 Personnel shortages in a public health emergency
could force existing providers to render care for conditions beyond their specific
expertise, or to treat conditions for which they are not "up to date. 2 5 Large
numbers of injured and sick patients could overwhelm already scarce resources and
create concern among health care providers that their medical care was suboptimal
and, rightly or wrongly, that they would be held liable if something were to go
wrong.26 Although the greatest concern would likely be liability for simple
negligence, some providers might be concerned about more serious charges, in
view of publicized accounts of health professionals accused of homicide while
caring for patients during Hurricane Katrina. 7
II.

LEGAL IMMUNITY AS AN INCENTIVE TO SERVE

A. TraditionalProtectionsfor Volunteers Against Liability Claims
1. Federal Volunteer ProtectionAct of 1997
In 1997, Congress enacted the Volunteer Protection Act (VPA), declaring that
"the willingness of volunteers to offer their services is deterred by the potential for
liability actions against them., 28 This statute applies to properly licensed or
otherwise authorized individuals "performing services for a nonprofit organization
or government entity," not receiving compensation over $500 per year.29 These
volunteers would receive immunity for actions that cause harm as long as the
actions were taken within the scope of their responsibilities to the organization or

23. See Arthur L. Kellermann, Crisis in the Emergency Department, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1300,
1301 (2006) (describing the effect of overcrowding in hospitals as a "rolling blackout").
24. See COMM'N ON HEALTH CARE FACILITIES IN THE 21ST CENTURY, A PLAN TO STABILIZE AND
STRENGTHEN

NEW

YORK'S

HEALTH

CARE

SYSTEM

4

(2006),

available

at

http://www.nyhealthcarecommission.org/docs/final/commissionfinalreport.pdf (describing New York
City's infrastructure as "fac[ing] ... mounting costs, excess capacity, and unmet needs," leading to
frequent bankruptcies and facility closures).
25. See Isaac Starr, Influenza in 1918: Recollections of the Epidemic in Philadelphia, 145 ANN.
INTERNAL MED. 138, 139 (2006) (describing the phenomenon of volunteer, retired physicians providing
suboptimal care during the 1918 influenza pandemic).
26. James G. Hodge Jr. et al., Emergency Legal Preparedness for Hospitals and Health Care
Personnel, 3 DISASTER MED. & PUB. HEALTH PREPAREDNESS (SUPP. 1) S37, S37, S42 (2009)
(enumerating legal risks to hospitals and providers, noting that "[d]isasters affecting the public health
can greatly compromise the ability of ill-prepared health care providers to render critical care resulting
in significant and avoidable morbidity and mortality").
27. See Affidavit for State of Louisiana, Louisiana v. Pou, No. 004039743 (July 2006), availableat
http://www.nola.comlkatrina/pdf/072006_nolacharges.pdf; infra Part II.C.
28. 42 U.S.C. § 14501(a)(1) (2006).
29. Id. § 14505(6).
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government entity. 30 Immunity generally applies to acts of ordinary negligence in
specific circumstances delineated by statute, but not, in most cases, to acts of
"willful or criminal misconduct, gross negligence, reckless misconduct, or a
conscious, flagrant indifference to the rights and safety of the individual
harmed ....
Nonprofit organizations and government entities do not generally rely on the
VPA because of its limitations. For example, the VPA provides liability protection
for volunteers but not for the nonprofit or government entity utilizing them.32
Furthermore, although the VPA preempts state law that is inconsistent with its
provisions, the statute does not preempt state law that provides additional liability
protection,33 and allows the states to opt out of federal coverage.34 Also, states are
permitted to impose certain conditions or limits in order for immunity to apply,
such as requiring mandatory training of volunteers, or requiring the entity to
provide a "financially secure source of recovery" for individuals harmed by the
actions of a volunteer.35 States have taken a variety of options permitted under the
VPA.36
The VPA has seldom been tested in the courts, so there is little guidance on
how this act should be applied in the health care setting. The VPA might not cover
the extraordinary situation of a community wide disaster when nonaffiliated
providers or other volunteers, including those from other states, might
spontaneously arrive at a hospital hoping to help; 37 the VPA applies in limited

situations to a "civil action in a state court ... in which all parties are citizens of the
State,, 38 so in states opting out of the VPA, liability protection coverage for out-ofstate volunteers would need to come from another source.39

30. Id. § 14503(a)(1).
31. Id. § 14503(a)(3).
32. Id. § 14503(c).
33. Id. § 14502(a).
34. Id. § 14502(b).
35. Id. § 14503(d)(1)-(4).
36. See infra Part lI.A.2.
37. See Mimi Hall, States Cutting Disaster Red Tape; Bills Seek Quick OKfor Medical Help, USA
TODAY, Oct. 9, 2007, at Al, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-10-08disasterdoctorsN.htm (quoting a member of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws as suggesting that the infrastructure limitations resulting from disasters should not prohibit
"allowing doctors to practice across state lines").
38. § 14502(b).
39. See infra Part lI.B.
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2. State Volunteer Liability Protection Statutes
State volunteer protection laws have long existed for the express purpose of
encouraging volunteerism, including some with provisions similar to the VPA.4 °
However, the nature of liability protection varies from state to state. For example,
liability protection often provides indemnity rather than immunity; 41 thus, a claim
could go forward but payment of damages would be covered by malpractice
insurance purchased by the state or the organization, state funds available to
claimants, or other mechanisms. The authority of states to impose conditions or
limitations on volunteer immunity under the VPA 42 has led to broad variations in
liability provisions. For example, in South Dakota the state's immunity provision
cannot be used as an affirmative defense if a volunteer or the entity employing the
volunteer participates in a risk-sharing pool or purchases liability insurance. 43 The
broad range of traditional volunteer liability protections among the states has been
reviewed in detail. 4
3. Good SamaritanStatutes
Good Samaritan statutes cover actions taken by individuals who come upon
an emergency by chance.45 These statutes generally provide civil immunity from
liability for ordinary negligence, and do not generally apply to clinicians with a
pre-established duty of care to the patient or to those acting with the expectation of
compensation.46 States vary as to whether liability protection would apply in the

40. UNIFORM EMERGENCY VOLUNTEER HEALTH PRACTITIONERS ACT ANN. 55 n.9 (Nat'l
Conference of Comm'ns of Unif. State Laws, Proposed Draft 2007), available at
http://www.uevhpa.org/Uploads/UEVHPAAnnotatedNov07.pdf [hereinafter UEVHPA] (indicating
that some states have adopted Volunteer Protection Acts, including Colorado, which has adopted COLO.
REV. STAT. § 13-21-115.5(4)(a)(1), and Delaware, which has adopted DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10,
§ 8133(b)).
41. Paul A. Hattis, Overcoming Barriers to Physician Volunteerism: Summary of State Laws
ProvidingReduced Malpractice Liability Exposurefor Clinician Volunteers, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 167,
169 (noting that most states with liability protection laws either change the standard of care for
negligence or indemnify volunteer health care providers).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 14503(d).
43. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-23-32 (2008).
44. See generally Hattis, supra note 41; James G. Hodge, Jr. et al., The Legal Framework for
Meeting Surge Capacity Through the Use of Volunteer Health Professionals During Public Health
Emergencies and OtherDisasters,22 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 5 (2005).
45. See Hodge, supra note 44, at 36-37 ("In most states, health professionals volunteering in good
faith and without compensation at the scene of an emergency are protected from civil liability for
ordinary negligence.").
46. See, e.g., N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6527(2) (McKinney 2006 & Supp. 2009) ("[A]ny licensed
physician who voluntarily and without.., compensation renders first aid or emergency treatment at the
scene of an accident or other emergency ... shall not be liable for damages ... unless ... caused by
gross negligence .... [This] shall [not] be deemed or construed to relieve a licensed physician from
in the normal and ordinary course of his
liability for damages . . . caused by an act or omission .
practice.").
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Good Samaritan laws

generally provide liability protection for health professionals explicitly, 48 but in

many cases protect members of other professions, such as fire or police, or "any
person" providing such assistance.49
B. Liability Protectionfor Volunteers Working Duringa Disaster
Since 2001, and despite new initiatives to address disasters, certain problems
have remained. For example, although the need for health care professionals
following Hurricane Katrina was great, large numbers of volunteers who came to
assist from outside of New Orleans, often after traveling great distances, were
reportedly not permitted into the city because of questions regarding credentialing
and liability.5 ° All states have adopted EMAC,5' in which "officers or employees of
a party state rendering aid in another state ... [are] considered agents of the

requesting state for tort liability and immunity purposes," and would not be held
liable for acts rendered in "good faith," which would exclude "willful misconduct,
gross negligence, or recklessness." 5 2 However, because EMAC provisions do not
apply to volunteers from the private sector,53 additional agreements or state
statutory provisions would be needed to make such individuals temporary state
employees under emergency circumstances.54

47. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-7703 (2006) (applying the protection to volunteer health care
providers assisting at a free medical clinic); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-2891(c) (2005) (applying the
protection to health care providers rendering such care within a hospital until the responsible physician
or person is available).
48. See, e.g., 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 49/5-75 (West 2002 & Supp. 2008) (protecting specific
licensed professionals, including dentists, physicians, nurses, and physician assistants, among others); cf
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 518 (West 2000) (protecting only health practitioners).
49. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-714 (2008) (providing for limited liability for emergency
care workers rendering care at the scene of an emergency); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-4-501 (2008)
(applying Good Samaritan Act to a person who in general assists in defined emergency situations
without receiving renumeration). But see UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-13-2 (2007 & Supp. 2008) (applying to
a number of health care providers, but not specifically including other emergency personnel).
50. UNIF. EMERGENCY VOLUNTEER HEALTH PRACTITIONERS ACT prefatory note (Nat'l Conference

of Comm'rs of Unif. State Laws, Proposed Draft 2007), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/
archives/ulc/uiehsa/2007act final.pdf [hereinafter UEVHPA prefatory note]; see also Hall, supra note
37.
51. UEVHPA prefatory note, supra note 50, at 3.
52. Emergency Management Assistance Compact, Pub. L. No. 104-321, § 1, 110 Stat. 3877, 3880
(1996).
53. See id. (specifically removing liability from a state, its "[o]fficers or employees ... rendering
aid in another state" consistent with the Compact).
54. Memorandum from James G. Hodge, Principal Investigator, & Lance A. Gable, Project
Director, of the Ctr. for Law & Pub.'s Health at Georgetown & Johns Hopkins Univ. on Hurricane
Katrina and Rita Responses-Legal Lessons (2005), available at http://www.publichealthlaw.net/
Research/PDF/Katrina%20-%2OLegal%2OLessons%20Leamed.pdf.
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Recognition of such gaps was followed by creation of the model Uniform
Emergency Volunteer Health Practitioners Act (UEVHPA) in 2007. 55 In addition to
establishing an organized system for the use of volunteer health practitioners under
state direction,56 a volunteer health practitioner providing services under the
UEVHPA would not be "liable for damages for an act or omission of the
practitioner in providing those services" except in the case of egregious or criminal
conduct, claims by the host entity, and certain other circumstances.57 In contrast to
the VPA, UEVHPA would confer the added benefit and possible incentive of
making workers' compensation available in case of death or injury of the
volunteer.5 8 Broad adoption of the Act, if uniformly applied and construed, would
provide uniform standards among states regarding liability coverage and
registration of volunteer health practitioners, and theoretically improve
coordination of efforts involving interstate responses.5 9 To date, six states have
adopted this Act,6° and it has been introduced in several others.6'
The UEVHPA would provide liability protection to individual volunteers,62
but would leave it to each state to determine whether such protection should apply
to entities, 63 which are not protected under laws such as the federal VPA,64 and
would otherwise be vicariously liable for acts of their volunteers. A more recent
Good Samaritan Entity Liability Protection Initiative promotes legislation at the
state level to provide liability protection for good faith voluntary efforts by
business and nonprofit entities in emergencies.65
The exclusions under existing immunity provisions for volunteers, including
under the UEVHPA, would be minimized under law geared specifically to public
health emergencies and other disasters. The Model State Emergency Health Powers

55. UEVHPA prefatory note, supra note 50, at 6.
56. UEVHPA, supra note 40, § 3.
57. Id. § 11 Alternative A (a)-(d).
58. Compare id. § 12 (providing for workers' compensation in the case of injury or death under
UEVHPA), with Volunteer Protection Act of 1997, 42 U.S.C. § 14503(c) (2000).
59. UEVHPA, supranote 40, § 13 cmt. (urging that states must consider the benefits of uniformity
of law and that uniformity is a principle objective of the act).
60. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-29.3-101 to -113 (Supp. 2008); IND. CODE ANN §§ 10-14-3.5-1
to -22 (LexisNexis Supp. 2008); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 39A.350 to .366 (West Supp. 2008); N.M.
STAT. ANN. §§ 12-12A-1 to -13 (LexisNexis Supp. 2008); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 58-2-801 to -813
(Supp. 2008); UTAH CODE ANN, §§ 26-49-101 to -701 (2008); see also UEVHPA.org, Enactment Status
Map, http://www.uevhpa.org/DesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex=2&tabid=67 (last visited Nov. 25, 2009).
61. UEVHPA.org, supra note 60.
62. UEVHPA, supranote 40, § II Alternative A.
63. See id. § II cmt. 2 (instructing that states make the final policy determination between
Alternatives A and B). Compare id. § II Alternative A (protecting entities from vicarious liability), with
id. § II Alternative B (subjecting entities to vicarious liability claims).
64. 42 U.S.C. § 14503(c) (2006).
65. North Carolina Institute for Public Health, Public/Private Legal Preparedness Initiative,
http://nciph.sph.unc.edu/law/good-sam.htm (last visited Nov. 25, 2009).
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Act (MSEHPA) would confer specific powers to the governor during a declared
public health emergency, in order to protect the public in the face of "[n]ew and
emerging dangers-including emergent and resurgent infectious diseases and
incidents of civilian mass casualties ... .,,66 Under MSEHPA, in-state health care
providers acting within the scope of their responsibilities in a declared emergency
would be immune from civil liability for the death or injury to a person, except in
the case of gross negligence or willful misconduct. 67 In the case of out-of-state
providers, this exception to immunity extends to "a reckless disregard for the
consequences so as to affect the life or health of the patient., 68 By July 2006,
twenty-three states had introduced or adopted provisions based on MSEHPA's
§ 804 immunity provision, thus augmenting and in some cases enhancing liability
protections previously available under state law.69 In one of these states, a health
care provider is immune from criminal as well as civil liability during a
catastrophic health emergency proclamation as long as he or she "acts in good
faith. 7 °
C. Would Immunity Provisions Have the Desired Effect?
Although immunity would lessen the disincentive to serve because of liability
concerns, it could theoretically hamper the quality of care provided. One critic of
MSEHPA has asserted there is no evidence from the recent past that health care
providers are reluctant to assist, citing the high level of volunteerism in the wake of
the September 11 th and subsequent anthrax attacks. 71 Furthermore, immunity might
mean that patients would not have recourse for any injury they might suffer,
especially if treated by out-of-state providers, who would have immunity for
"everything but manslaughter., 72 Lack of recourse for patients would be of
particular concern if clinicians were called upon to provide treatment for which
they lacked or no longer had skill.73 In this case, a preferable alternative might be
indemnity, in which a claim could go forward but damages would be paid by a
variety of mechanisms. 74 For example, members of New York City's MRC are
considered employees of the city when deployed, and receive protection in the form

66. MSEHPA, supranote 4, § 102(b).
67. Id. § 804(a)-(b).
68. Id. § 608(b)(3).

69. CTR. FOR LAW & THE PUB.'s HEALTH AT GEORGETOWN & JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVS., supra note
5, at4.
70. MD. CODE. ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 14-3A-06 (LexisNexis Supp. 2008).
71. George J. Annas, Bioterrorism, Public Health, and Civil Liberties, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1337, 1338-39 (2002).
72. Id. at 1341.
73. See generally Starr, supra note 25 (describing the author's recollection of his experience
tending to unknown ailments as a student in his third-year of medical school).
74. See supra Part II.A.2.
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of indemnification under state law, 75 whereas non-MRC volunteers in New York
76
might receive immunity by statute under certain circumstances.
A physician working under the extraordinary circumstances of a disaster
might find indemnification insufficient, since identities of health care providers
named in malpractice settlements or payments are reported by law to a national
data bank.77 The data bank has been criticized for being misleading and for not
excluding "nuisance case[s] with no real merit," while at the same time having the
potential to negatively impact physician licensure, staff privileges, and
insurability. 78 However, even immunity might not ease liability concerns for
physicians aware of the health professionals charged with homicide during
Hurricane Katrina.7 9 Available information regarding the case supports the charged
physician's contention that her administration of sedating medications to respiratordependent patients was consistent with accepted methods of palliative care, rather
than an intentional overdose as the prosecution charged.80 This case has been
highly publicized in the news media,81 and has received considerable attention in
the medical literature as well.82 Thus, even competent physicians practicing within
their field of expertise could reasonably fear adverse consequences, including

75. See N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 50-k(l)(e), (3) (McKinney 2007) (providing indemnity -to
"volunteer[s] expressly authorized to participate in a city sponsored volunteer program").
76. See N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 9193(1) (McKinney 2002 & Supp. 2008) ("[A] volunteer agency

performing civil defense services in this state ... in good faith ... shall not be liable for any injury
or death to persons or damage to property as the result thereof.").
77. 42 U.S.C. § 11 131(a)-(b) (2006).
78. Letter from Michael D. Maves, Executive Vice President and CEO, Am. Med. Ass'n, to Betsy
Ranslow, Assoc. Adm'r, Bureau of Health Professions (May 22, 2006), available at http://www.amaassn.org/amal/pub/upload/nn/395/ama comments-npdb.pdf; Am. Med. Ass'n, National Practitioner
Data Bank, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/legal-topics/business-managementtopics/national-practitioner-data-bank.shtml (last visited Nov. 25, 2009).
79. See Affidavit for State of Louisiana, supra note 27; Gwen Filosa & John Pope, Grand Jury
Refuses to Indict Dr. Anna Pou, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), July 24, 2007,
http://blog.nola.com/times-picayune/2007/07/grandjury refuses to indict.d.html
(illustrating
an
instance when criminal charges were sought against a doctor in an emergency situation and two nurses
who were later granted immunity to testify before a grand jury, which declined to indict the physician).
80. Susan Okie, Dr. Pou and the Hurricane-Implicationsfor Patient Care During Disasters,358
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1,4-5 (2008).
81. Sheri Fink, Strained by Katrina,a HospitalFacedDeadly Choices, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 30,
2009, at 30-46, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/30/magazine/30doctors.html (reporting
that civil wrongful death charges against the physician are still pending); James Vamey, Katrina Deaths
at Hospital Spawn Lawsuits, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), July 21,
2006,
http://www.nola.com/news/t-p/frontpage/index.ssf?/base/news-6/1154325678123470.xml&coll = 1.
82. See, e.g., Fred Charatan, New Orleans Doctor Is Chargedwith Giving Lethal Injections During
Floods, 333 BRIT. MED. J. 218, 218 (2006); Tyler J. Curiel, Murder or Mercy? HurricaneKatrina and
the Need for Disaster Training, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2067, 2067 (2006); Okie, supra note 80, at 1;
Anna Maria Pou, Hurricane Katrina and DisasterPreparedness,358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1524, 1524
(2008).
...
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criminal charges, and might not be mollified by the promise of immunity for
"ordinary negligence" in the extraordinary circumstances of a disaster.
Finally, the oft-cited enthusiasm for health professionals to assist ill strangers
likely emanates from experiences or emotions that have nothing to do with
knowledge of liability protections.83 For example, a group of commentators
discussing ethical obligations of their profession in a disaster argues that
emergency physicians as a group, like emergency medicine services personnel,
"possess rescue personalities and are more likely to stay at their stations than
others," and may be more likely to tolerate some risks because of "group
camaraderie. .. a sense of loyalty and mutual regard when carrying out a difficult
task together., 84 While it is unlikely that "rescue personalities" are confined to
those practicing emergency medicine, it is most likely that personal characteristics,
notably altruism, play a fundamental role in the willingness to serve.
III. Do PHYSICIANS HAVE A DUTY OF CARE DESPITE RISK TO THEMSELVES?

A. New and Emerging Dangers
A number of serious public health concerns have emerged in recent years,
including the threat of terrorism. These include "Class A" bioterrorist agents, such
as Clostridium botulinum toxin (botulism), anthrax, hemorrhagic fever viruses,
such as Ebola, and Yersinia pestis, the bacterium causing pneumonic plague.
Class A agents are those that "pose a risk to national security because they can be
easily disseminated or transmitted from person to person; result in high mortality
rates and have the potential for major public health impact; might cause public
panic and social disruption; and require special action for public health
preparedness. 86 Other dangers of great concern include an intentional release of
radiological material (i.e., a "dirty bomb"),87 or a highly lethal chemical agent, such
as sarin, which acts by paralyzing the nervous system.88 Sain was responsible for

83. See Lisa A. Eckenwiler, Emergency Health Professionals and the Ethics of Crisis, in IN THE
WAKE OF TERROR: MEDICINE AND MORALITY IN A TIME OF CRISIS 111, 114-15 (Jonathan D. Moreno
ed., 2003) (discussing potential reasons why health professionals commit to helping in emergencies).
84. Kenneth V. Iserson et al., Fight or Flight: The Ethics of Emergency Physician Disaster
Response, 51 ANNALS EMERGENCY MED. 345, 349 (2008).

85. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Bioterrorism Agents/Diseases (by Category),
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/agentlist-category.asp#adef (last visited Nov. 25, 2009).
86. Id.
87. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Radiation Emergencies, http://www.bt.cdc.gov/
radiation (last visited Nov. 25, 2009). For an explanation of dirty bombs, see U.S. NUCLEAR
REGULATORY COMM'N, FACT SHEET: DIRTY BOMBS (Mar. 2003), available at http://www.nrc.gov/

reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/dirty-bombs.pdf.
88. Ctrs. for Disease Control
& Prevention, Chemical
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/chemical/overview.asp (last visited Nov. 25, 2009).
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12 deaths and over 5000 injuries in the Tokyo subway system and resulted in
89
secondary illness in many health care workers who treated the victims.
Provider concerns for their own safety in a chemical or radiological attack
would be enhanced by shortages of potentially protective resources.
Decontamination facilities at hospital entrances have a limited ability to keep up
with a large flow of patients, since the cumbersome process takes between five and
twenty minutes for each patient brought in on a stretcher. 90 During
decontamination, the hospital is in "lockdown," so no one enters, including
physicians.91 Protective clothing, if available in sufficient supply, can only be
safely used by individuals trained in its use and vigorous enough to work while
outfitted, as highly protective suits can be very confining and poorly tolerated,
depending on the type and duration of work as well as factors such as
environmental temperature.92
Most recently, pandemic influenza has emerged as an important public health
concern. Although person-to-person transmission of novel Influenza A H5N1
(avian flu) virus has not been widely documented, the virus is affecting increasing
numbers of people in Asia,93 and has the potential for genetic modification to a
more easily transmissible strain.94 The actual pandemic of novel Influenza A HINI
(swine flu) virus 95 is currently deemed to be moderate in severity but this may
reflect relatively favorable socioeconomic conditions and health care access in

89. H. Nozaki et al., Secondary Exposure of Medical Staff to Sarin Vapor in the Emergency Room,
21 INTENSIVE CARE MEDICINE 1032, 1033 (1995); Susan Kreiffels, Japan Arrests Cult Leader, USA
TODAY, May 16, 1995, at IA.
90. U.S. ARMY MEDICAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF CHEMICAL DEFENSE, MEDICAL MANAGEMENT
OF CHEMICAL CASUALTIES HANDBOOK 201 (3d ed. 2000).

91. See, e.g., Hazmat Exposure Leaves 2 Dead, Prompts Lockdown of Hospitals, FoxNews.com
(Aug. 31, 2008), http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,414041,00.html; Amanda O'Donnell, 2 ERs
Placed on Lockdown After Chemical Scare, CNN.com (Aug. 31, 2008), http://www.cnn.com/2008/
US/08/30/hospital.lockdowns/index.html.
92. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.120 app. B (2008).
93. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PANDEMIC PLANNING UPDATE VI 2-4 (2009),
available at http://www.flu.gov/professional/pdf/panflureport6.pdf (documenting the growing number of
countries affected with H5N I virus in animals, the increasing number of confirmed human deaths as a
result of the virus, and large number of cases in humans who have contracted the virus in Asia). See
generally WORLD HEALTH ORG., H5NI AVIAN INFLUENZA: TIMELINE OF MAJOR EVENTS (2008),
available at http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian-influenza/Timeline_08%2009%2023.pdf (cataloging
the timeline of H5N I avian influenza virus cases reported globally).
94. See Writing Comm. of the Second World Health Org. Consultation on Clinical Aspects of
Human Infection with Avian Influenza A (H5N1) Virus, Update on Avian Influenza A (H5NI) Virus
Infection in Humans, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 261, 264 (2008) [hereinafter Writing Comm.] (noting that
H5N I mutations may have permitted human acquisition of avian influenza in some cases, but that "these
mutations appear to be insufficient for efficient human-to-human transmission" so that "[c]hanges in
multiple viral genes [would] probably [be] required to generate a potentially pandemic influenza A
(H5NI) virus").
95. See Chan, World Health Org., supra note 2, at 1.
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countries where most cases have been reported, and might poorly predict a future
96
"bleaker picture" in countries that lack such advantages.
During the epidemic of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), a
substantial number of deaths were reportedly among physicians, as well as other
health care workers, suggesting that many if not most acquired infection during
treatment of patients and not before. 97 Uncertainties about prevention98 as well as
treatment 99 of influenza would raise particular concerns in the event of a pandemic
with a lethal strain. The reliability of N95 respirators, which are specialized masks
designed to filter out 95% of viruses and other very small particles, has been
questioned. 00 SARS Coronavirus, and probably influenza virus, as well as certain
other infectious organisms, are usually carried on respiratory droplets, but are
sometimes transmissible through air currents for distances of up to six feet, so
transmission does not always require close patient contact.' 0 l These and other
"airborne" organisms require enhanced protective equipment, such as individually
fit-tested masks like N95 respirators or masks offering even higher protection, and
special "airborne infection isolation rooms."' 0 2 Sophisticated airborne protection
equipment, in particular isolation rooms, are often in short supply in hospitals, even

96. Id. at 2.
97. Kent A. Sepkowitz & Leon Eisenberg, OccupationalDeaths Among Healthcare Workers, 11
EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1003, 1007 (2005), available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/
vol II no07/pdfs/04-1038.pdf.
98. See Anna Balazy et al., Do N95 Respirators Provide 95% Protection Level Against Airborne
Viruses, and How Adequate Are Surgical Masks?, 34 AM. J. INFECTION CONTROL 51, 52, 56 (2006)
(studying whether "respirators and healthcare masks" adequately protect "against aerosolized viral
particles" and concluding that, while "N95 respirators may fall below 95%" efficiency, "surgical masks
[provide] much lower" protection); Writing Comm., supra note 94, at 271 (discussing the need for
deliberation regarding vaccine use given the uncertainty with respect to timing and cause of an influenza
pandemic as well as the lack of clarity surrounding adverse consequences of immunization).
99. See Writing Comm., supra note 94, at 268, 270 (noting reports of fatalities associated with
antiviral drug resistance, and indicating that the ability of antivirals and other treatments to reduce
overall mortality has yet to be determined).
100. Balazy et al., supra note 98, at 56.
101. See JANE D. SIEGEL ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 2007 GUIDELINE FOR
ISOLATION PRECAUTIONS: PREVENTING TRANSMISSION OF INFECTIOUS AGENTS IN HEALTHCARE

SETTINGS 19 (2007), available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dhqp/pdf/guidelines/lsolation2OO7.pdf
(citing evidence that transmission of SARS Coronavirus, influenza virus, and noroviruses is primarily
through respiratory droplets, and noting that, although not proven, demonstrations exist of "short
distance transmission by small particle aerosols"); Francoise M. Blachere et al., Measurement of
Airborne Influenza Virus in a Hospital Emergency Department, 48 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES
438, 438 (2009) ("[Ilnfluenza virus may... be transmitted by inhalation of small airborne particles" and
"[o]bservational and epidemiological studies suggest that airborne influenza transmission occurs among
people.
102. JANE D. SIEGEL ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 101, at 27.
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during non-epidemic circumstances, and are not found in offices, radiology suites,
10 3
or most operating rooms.

Finally, although infection with certain naturally occurring or putative
bioterrorist agents may be preventable or manageable, such agents could be
widespread before index cases were identified and public health measures were
adopted.

04

B. Duty of Care in Non-DisasterSituations: Application to a Disaster
1. ProfessionalCodes of Ethics
The 1847 American Medical Association (AMA) Code of Ethics stated that
"when pestilence prevails, it is [the] duty [of physicians] to face the danger, and
continue their labors for the alleviation of suffering, even at the jeopardy of their
own lives." 105 By 1977, the fear of epidemics had waned' 0 6 and the duty of the
older code was viewed as an "historical anachronism." 10 7 By that time, the AMA

103. See, e.g., id. at 71 (offering alternative methods of preventing transmission of airborne
infections "in settings where Airborne Precautions cannot be implemented due to limited engineering
resources (e.g. physician offices)"); Amy H. Kaji & Roger J. Lewis, Hospital DisasterPreparednessin
Los Angeles County, 13 ACADEMIC EMERGENCY MEDICINE 1198, 1202 (2006) (finding, among other
shortages, potentially limiting hospital disaster preparedness that "more than half had fewer than ten
designated isolation rooms"); see also Preparingfor Pandemic Flu: Hearing Before the S. Special
Comm. on Aging, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of the Am. Hosp. Ass'n), available at
http://www.ucop.edu/riskmgt/documents/aha-panflu-testimony.pdf (stating that, "in sustained disaster
such as a pandemic," even by doubling the number of "negative pressure rooms available for patient
isolation .. .[Washington D.C. Hospital Center] would be unable to effectively isolate the number of
patients anticipated in a pandemic involving an unknown pandemic infectious agent or a known airborne
infectious agent").
104. See Chan, World Health Org., supra note 2, at 1-2 (reporting in June 2009, in the absence of
vaccine availability, "nearly 30,000 confirmed cases [of swine flu] ... from 74 countries"); Donald A.
Henderson et al., Smallpox as a Biological Weapon: Medical and Public Health Management, 281
JAMA 2127, 2136-37 (1999) (noting that a smallpox outbreak would be devastating "unless effective
control measures can quickly be brought to bear" and that "[e]arly detection, isolation of infected
individuals, surveillance of contacts, and a focused selective vaccination program are the essential items
of a control program"); Thomas V. Inglesby et al., Plague as a Biological Weapon: Medical and Public
Health Management, 283 JAMA 2281, 2289 (2000) ("Improving the medical and public health response
to an outbreak of plague following the use of a biological weapon will require . . . improved rapid
diagnostic and standard laboratory microbiology techniques" and "[ain improved understanding of
prophylactic and therapeutic antibiotic regimens ....
").
105. AM. MED. ASS'N, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION app.

E ch. III art. I § 1,at 105 (Chicago, American Medical Association Press 1847), available at
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/upload/mmi/369/1847code.pdf.
106. See Leslie P. Francis et al., How Infectious Diseases Got Left Out-And What this Omission
Might Have Meant for Bioethics, 19 BIOETHICS 307, 307 & n. 1 (2005) (quoting United States Surgeon
General William H. Stewart in a 1967 speech to the Association of State and Territorial Health Officers
where he said "[i]t is time to close the book on infectious disease").
107. Samuel J. Huber & Matthew K. Wynia, When Pestilence Prevails . . . Physician
Responsibilitiesin Epidemics, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Winter 2004, at W5, W7.

JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY

[VOL. 12:195

Code had accepted the concept that "free choice of physicians is the right of every
individual," but that the concept of free choice also allows a physician to "decline
to accept [an] individual as a patient."' l While maintaining the physician's
freedom to choose whom to serve, the AMA in 1986 affirmed that the physician is,
nonetheless, ethically obliged not to discriminate on the basis of "race, color,
religion, national origin, sexual orientation or any other basis that would constitute
invidious discrimination."''0 9 Antidiscrimination policy was subsequently extended
to HIV status."l 0 Furthermore, the AMA Code has long declared that the
physician's freedom "to choose whom to serve, with whom to associate, and the
environment in which to provide medical care" does not extend to emergencies.II
Despite these broad restrictions on freedom of choice, however, the AMA did not
reinstitute a specific obligation for physicians to treat "at the jeopardy of their
lives.""'12
Following the September 1 th terrorist attacks, the AMA readdressed the
issue of duty in the face of risk in a declaration that physicians should pledge to
"[a]pply our knowledge and skills when needed, though doing so may put us at
risk."'' 13 However, this portion of the declaration was explicitly directed to
physicians in their roles as educators rather than clinicians, and did not represent a
return to the original ethic or a revision of the Code of Ethics."' 4 Subsequently, the
AMA adopted an Opinion on the physician's role in disaster preparedness and
response, which states that "individual physicians have an obligation to provide
urgent medical care during disasters," an "ethical obligation [that] holds even in the
face of greater than usual risks to their own safety, health or life." ' 1 5 Noting that the
physician workforce is "not an unlimited resource," the Opinion states that the

108. COUNCIL ON ETHICAL & JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AM. MED. ASS'N, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS OF
THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION § 9.06, at 308-09 (2008-2009 ed. 2008) [hereinafter AMA
CODE].

109. Id. § 9.12, at 325; see also Am. Osteopathic Ass'n, Code of Ethics § 3,
http://www.osteopathic.org/index.cfm?PagelD=aoaethics (last visited Nov. 25, 2009) (extending the
antidiscrimination policy to handicapped individuals, but failing to include sexual orientation as a
factor).
110. See AMA CODE, supra note 108, § 2.23, at 119, § 9.131, at 334 (issuing the guidelines, in 1992,
that "[i]t is unethical to deny treatment to HIV-infected individuals because they are HIV seropositive or
because they are unwilling to undergo HIV testing" and that "[p]ersons who are seropositive should not
be subjected to discrimination based on fear or prejudice").
11. Id. at princs. VI, at xv; see also JUDICIAL COUNCIL, AM. MED. ASS'N, PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL
ETHICS § 5 (1958), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/upload/mm/369/1957-principles.pdf ("A

physician may choose whom he will serve. In an emergency, however, he should render service to the
best of his ability.").
112. See AM. MED. ASS'N, supranote 105, § 1, at 105.
113. AM. MED. ASS'N, REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS: A
DECLARATION OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 3 (2001), available at http://www.ama-

assn.org/amal/pub/upload/mm/369/ceja-5i01.pdf.
114. Id. at 2.
115. AMA CODE, supra note 108, § 9.067, at 313.
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physician participating in disaster responses "should balance immediate benefits to
individual patients with ability to care for patients in the future." '" 6 Thus, although
physicians are admonished to balance risks to themselves against the duty to the
patient, the AMA Code notes the balance is, in the end, for the sake of the patient.
The World Medical Association (WMA) Statement on Avian and Pandemic
Influenza declares that "[p]hysicians have an ethical responsibility to provide
services to the injured or ill,"

17

and "will have a strong public health duty in the

time of a pandemic [when] his/her services will be critical at a time when surge
capacity will be stressed." ' 81 At the same time, the WMA admonishes the physician
to "take all measures necessary to protect their own health and the health of their
staff,"" 9 and "have resources in place in the event they and/or their own families
20

become infected."'1

With the exception of the AMA, physician codes of ethics in the United
States are largely silent with regard to the issue of obligations in the face of
personal risk. For example, the American College of Physicians, whose members
2
number 126,000 physicians practicing internal medicine and its specialties,' '
proscribes as unethical "[t]he denial of appropriate care to a class of patients for
any reason, including disease state ....
22 This opinion was based on the
organization's 1988 position statement regarding HIV-AIDS, 123 in response to fear
on the part of many health professionals and reluctance to treat patients, 124 and
therefore implicitly supports the obligation to treat despite personal risk. However,
advances in HIV care and better understanding of prevention of HIV transmission
to health care workers 125 have likely reduced the impact of any such implied
obligation in the position statement.

116. Id.
117. World Med. Ass'n, WMA Statement on Avian and PandemicInfluenza, 52 WORLD MED. J. 100,
§ 11(h), at 103, § 1 l(h)(i), at 103 (2006), available at http://www.wma.net/en/30publications/
20joumal/pdf/wmj 12.pdf.
118. Id. § I I(h)(i), at 103.
119. Id. § 1 (h)(ii), at 103.
120. Id. § I1(h), at 103.
121. Am. Coll. Physicians, Who We Are, http://www.acponline.org/about-acp/who-we-are/ (last
visited Nov. 25, 2009).
122. Lois Snyder & Cathy Leffler, Ethics Manual: Fifth Edition, 142 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 560,

565 (2005).
123. See id. (citing Theodore C. Eickhoff, The Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) and
Infection with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), 108 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 460, 462 (1988)
("The denial of appropriate care to patients for any reason is unethical.")).
124. See Eickhoff, supra note 123, at 463 ("The approach to patient care ... should be based on
knowledge of the actual risks of infection and not on speculation or unwarranted fears.").
125. Compare id. at 460 (noting the various means of transmission, yet failing to explicitly list
occupational transmission), with Elise M. Beltrami et al., U.S. Dep't Health & Human Servs., Updated
U.S. Public Health Service Guidelinesfor the Management of Occupational Exposures to HB V, HCV,
and HIV and Recommendationsfor PostexposureProphylaxis, MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP.,

JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY

[VOL. 12:195

Perhaps surprisingly, even the Code of Ethics of the American College of
126
Emergency Physicians is silent regarding a need to tolerate personal risk.
However, not only are emergency physicians obliged to serve "as health care
providers of last resort for many patients who have no other feasible access to
care,"' 127 but the Code states that "access to quality emergency care is a
fundamental individual right and should be available to all who seek it," regardless
of "race, religion, gender, ethnic background, social status, type of illness or injury,
128
or ability to pay."'
Finally, the AMA's Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs has recently
emphasized that the requirement to treat in an emergency is a "fundamental
exception" to the physician's freedom to choose whom to treat. 129 At least on this
issue, there is a virtual consensus among medical organizations, including the
American Osteopathic Association, 130 the American College of Emergency
Physicians,' 31 the American College of Physicians,
Association,

13 3

of which

the

AMA

is

the

32

and the World Medical

National

Member Association
representing the U.S.134 In short, despite limited mention of personal risk, codes of

Jun. 29, 2001, at 7-8, availableat http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/rr/rr5011 .pdf (discussing in detail the
risk of occupational transmission of HIV).
126. But see Am. Coll. Emergency Physicians, Code of Ethics for Emergency Physicians § II(A)(3),
in 52 ANNALS EMERGENCY MED. 581, 584 (2008), available at http://www.acep.org/
practres.aspx?id=29144 (defining courage-one of the virtues in emergency medicine-as "the ability to
carry out one's obligations despite personal risk or danger"); Iserson et al., supra note 84, at 347
(describing the "emergency physician's responsibility to put patient welfare first" as the most important
of emergency physician's ethical principles).
127. Am. Coll. Emergency Physicians, supra note 126, § II(A)(2), at 583.
128. See id. § II(D)(3)(a), at 588.
129. AM. MED. ASS'N, REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS: PHYSICIANS
TO TREATMENT AND INDIVIDUAL PATIENT DISCRIMINATION 1 (2007), available at

OBJECTION

http://www.ama-assn.org/amal /pub/upload/mm/369/ceja.6a07.pdf.
130. Am. Osteopathic Ass'n, supra note 109, § 3 ("In emergencies, a physician should make his/her
services available.").
131. See Am. Coll. Emergency Physicians, supra note 126, § 1(2), at 582, § II(A)(2), at 583,
§ ll(D)(3)(d), at 589 (finding that, in addition to a duty to "[riespond promptly and expertly, without
prejudice or partiality, to the need for emergency medical care," an ethical duty exists beyond the
hospital to offer assistance as a special resource in the community and "to respond to prehospital
emergencies and disasters").
132. See Snyder & Leffler, supra note 122, at 562 (noting the duty "to provide care to an individual
person... when emergency treatment is required").
133. See World Med. Ass'n, World Medical Association InternationalCode of Medical Ethics, 52
WORLD MED. J. 87, 87 (2006), available at http://www.wma.net/en/30publications/20joumal/pdf/
wmj 12.pdf ("A physician shall give emergency care as a humanitarian duty unless he/she is assured that
others are willing and able to give such care.").
134. World Med. Ass'n, WMA Directory of National Member Medical Associations Officers and
Council, 52 WORLD MED. J., Dec. 2006, at i, iii, available at http://www.wma.net/en/30publications/
20journal/pdf/wmj 12.pdf.
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ethics governing physician behavior would be misread if they were interpreted as
condoning that doctors flee the area in the event of an epidemic.
2. Codes of Ethics and the Law
Although professional codes do not themselves constitute binding law, 135 the
codes find their way into the law implicitly and explicitly. Medical Boards have
statutory authority to develop standards for the medical profession, including codes
of conduct, and may impose sanctions for violation of professional ethical
36
standards, including loss of licensure.1
A model act developed by the Federation of State Medical Boards provides
guidance to states in promulgating medical practice acts, and defines
"unprofessional or dishonorable conduct" to include "violation of any provision of
a national code of ethics acknowledged by the Board."' 137 In Texas, the provider is
required to "adhere to established professional codes of ethics," as these codes
"define the professional context within which the provider works."' 38 Some states
have codified specific medical codes of ethics in their regulations. In Nevada, the
State Board of Medical Examiners is authorized to initiate disciplinary action or
deny licensure to a physician whose conduct "violates any provision of a code of
ethics adopted by the Board by regulation based on a national code of ethics.' 39 In
New Mexico, the Board has specifically adopted the AMA Code of Ethics for this
purpose. 140 The Rhode Island State Medical Board "relies upon the AMA [C]ode of
[E]thics as the legal standard" in determining professional conduct, according to
the state's Department of Health website.' 4' In Utah, medical records must be
maintained to "be consistent with" the AMA Code of Ethics, 142 in accordance with
the state's Medical Practice Act, which requires that "[m]edical records maintained
by a licensee shall meet the standards and ethics of the profession.
...
14 The
Kentucky statute specifically authorizes its Medical Board to use the Codes of
Ethics of the AMA and the American Osteopathic Association in its finding of
"dishonorable, unethical or unprofessional conduct,"' 44 and specifies that failure to

135. Zita Lazzarini, An Analysis of Ethical Issues in Prescribing and Dispensing Syringes to
Injection Drug Users, I I HEALTH MATRIX 85, 90 (2001).
136. ESSENTIALS OF A MODERN MED. PRACTICE ACT §§ III(B)(3), IX(A)(1) (Fed'n of State Med.
Bd. of the U.S. 2006).
137. Id. § IX(D), § IX(D)(37).
138. 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 448.216 (2009).

139. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630.301(9) (LexisNexis 2008).
140. N.M. CODE R. § 16.10.8.9 (Weil 2009).
141. R.I. Dep't Health, Board of Medical Licensure and Discipline, http://www.health.ri.gov/
hsr/bmld/ (last visited Nov. 25, 2009).
142. UTAH ADMIN. CODE r.156-67-602(2) (2009).

143. UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-67-803(i)(a) (2007).
144. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.597(4) (West 2006).
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conform to the principles of the code
can lead to license suspension even if actual
145
injury to a patient is not established.
Finally, courts have often relied on medical codes of ethics to provide
guidance in reaching certain decisions. In a Vermont case, the state's highest court
agreed "as a general matter, with those courts that accept professional ethics codes
as potential sources of public policy," with the conditions that the ethical provisions
relied upon be "sufficiently concrete" and those being applied be "primarily for the
benefit of the public as opposed to the interests of the profession alone."'146 In a
Maryland case involving a forensic psychiatrist, the court noted that the Maryland
State Board of Physicians recognizes the AMA Code in general, and in this
particular case, relied also on specific guidelines of the American Academy of
Psychiatry and the Law, as well as the American Psychiatric Society annotations of
the AMA Code that are applicable to psychiatry. 147 Finally, in upholding a
Washington state law banning assisted suicide, the U.S. Supreme Court cited the
AMA Code of Ethics' disapproval of physician-assisted suicide, in support of the
legitimate government interest in maintaining the integrity and ethics of the
48
medical profession.1
Courts do not uniformly find that ethics codes can serve as a source of public
policy, and when they do, it is with provisos. For example, in a New Jersey case, a
physician who refused to perform research could not prevail in her claim of
wrongful discharge by simply stating the research violated her interpretation of the
Hippocratic oath; 1 49 rather, an employee must show how the disputed issue
involved a clear mandate of public policy, expressions of which could be found not
only in legislation, administrative rules, and judicial decisions, but also, under some
circumstances, in professional codes. 50 In a Vermont decision involving a
physician who claimed wrongful termination of employment for refusing to refer
cases to physicians whom he felt provided inadequate medical care, the Court
found that professional codes, like the AMA Principles of Medical Ethics, can
serve as potential sources of public policy, as long as the proponent of the code can
prove that the code articulates a "clear and compelling public policy."' 151 In

145. See id. § 311.595(9).
146. LoPresti v. Rutland Reg'l Health Servs., 865 A.2d 1102, 1112 (Vt. 2004) (citing Rocky
Mountain Hosp. and Med. Serv. v. Mariani, 916 P.2d 519, 525 (Colo. 1996)); see also Pierce v. Ortho
Pharm. Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 512 (N.J. 1980) (holding, in a case of a physician who refused to perform
research in violation of her professional code of ethics, "that an employee has a cause of action for
wrongful discharge when the discharge is contrary to a clear mandate of public policy," which could be
expressed in a "professional code of ethics").
147. Salerian v. Md. State Bd. of Physicians, 932 A.2d 1225, 1235-36 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2007).
148. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 731 (1997) (citing AMA Code of Ethics' disapproval
of physician-assisted suicide as "fundamentally incompatible with physician's role as healer").
149. Pierce,417 A.2d at 507, 513, 518.
150. Id.at 512.
151. LoPresti,865 A.2d at 1112, 1114.
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contrast, an Illinois decision seemed to foreclose the possibility that the AMA Code
could provide an expression of public policy. In a ruling involving the objection to
physician covenants not-to-compete, the Illinois Supreme Court noted that an AMA
Opinion was "not the equivalent of a. .. statute or rule of professional conduct and,
[therefore] ... does not provide a clear expression of the public policy of this
state."' 152 The Court did, however, find the AMA's position discouraging such
covenants to be commensurate with Illinois common law requirements that
"restrictive covenants be reasonable and not adverse to the public welfare."' 153
In short, although physician codes of ethics do not constitute binding law, at a
minimum, they serve as persuasive authority, and in some jurisdictions, physician
adherence to a code of ethics may be a legal requirement. Although several courts
have found that physicians' codes of ethics may serve, in some circumstances, as
expressions of public policy, the question remains whether courts would be
persuaded by the AMA obligation that physicians confront "risks to their own
154
safety, health or life" in order to benefit the public in a disaster.
3. The EstablishedPhysician-PatientRelationship and Abandonment
As a matter of common law, once a relationship has been established between
a patient and physician, the physician has an ongoing obligation to care for the
patient. 55 In the case of a generalist, this obligation would be broad, 156 whereas in
the case of a specialist the obligation might be limited to the conditions the
specialist has agreed to treat. 15 7 In either case, this obligation derives from the
express or implied contract between patient and physician that is established once
the physician has agreed to see the patient. 5 8 The patient as well as the physician
may discontinue the relationship at any time, 159 but if the physician unilaterally
wishes to discontinue, he or she must provide the patient with "reasonable notice"
to permit the patient to seek (though not necessarily succeed in finding) an

152. Mohanty v. St. John Heart Clinic, 866 N.E.2d 85, 94 (111. 2006).
153. Id. (citing Idbeis v. Wichita Surgical Specialists, 112 P.3d 81 (Kan. 2005)).
154. AMA CODE, supra note 108, § 9.067, at 313.
155. See, e.g., Ricks v. Budge, 64 P.2d 208, 211 (Utah 1937) ("[T]he law is well settled that a
physician or surgeon, upon undertaking an operation or other case, is under the duty ... of continuing
his attention ... so long as the case requires attention.").
156. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 798 (28th ed. 2006) (defining a generalist as "[a]n internist,
family physician, or pediatrician who performs general medicine; one who treats most diseases that do
not require surgery, sometimes including those related to obstetrics").
157. Id. at 1796 (characterizing a specialist as "[o]ne who has developed professional expertise in a
particular specialty or subject area").
158. See, e.g., Childs v. Weis, 440 S.W.2d 104, 107 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969) ("[I]t is unquestionably
the law that the relationship of physician and patient is dependent upon contract, either express or
implied ... ").
159. Ricks, 64 P.2d. at 211.
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alternative care provider. 160 If the situation is such that the patient is in need of
further attention, this notice should be "sufficient ... so the patient can procure
other medical attention if ... desire[d].,' 16 1 Not to do so would constitute
abandonment. 162 If the abandonment is found to be the proximate cause of injury to
163
the patient, the physician can be held liable for damages.
In some states, abandonment is explicitly forbidden by statute. In New York,
abandonment is considered unprofessional conduct' 64 and is subject to sanctions,
including possible loss of license. 165 Idaho's Medical Practice Act specifically
authorizes the Board of Medicine to discipline a physician on grounds of
"abandonment of a patient.' 66 In New Mexico, abandonment of patients is grounds
for license revocation on the basis of "unprofessional or dishonorable conduct." 167
In contrast, Virginia and Texas statutory provisions specifically delineate
procedures under which physicians may unilaterally sever a relationship. In
Virginia, a physician is not required to render treatment that he "determines to be
medically or ethically inappropriate;"'' 68 if this determination conflicts with the
patient's advance directive or request by the patient's designated surrogate, he must
attempt to transfer the patient to an agreeing physician and provide life-sustaining
69
treatment if needed, but is not required to continue treatment after fourteen days. 1
In Texas, a "medical futility" provision 170 protects a physician from civil and
criminal liability as well as professional disciplinary action for refusing to honor an
advance directive "or a health care or treatment decision made by or on behalf of a
patient," upon following certain procedures.' 7 ' If the physician is refusing a request
for life-sustaining treatment, he need only provide such treatment for ten days after
informing the patient or surrogate of a committee's concurrence that the

160. Id. at 211-12.
161. Id. at 212.
162. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 29.2(a)(1) (2009); see also Hill v. Medlantic Health
Care Group, 933 A2d. 314, 328 (D.C. 2007) (citing Miller v. Greater Se. Comm. Hosp., 508 A.2d 927,
929 (D.C. 1986)); MARK A. HALL ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS 170 (Aspen Publishers 2007)
(1955) (describing abandonment liability).
163. O'Neill v. Montefiore Hosp., 202 N.Y.S.2d 436, 440 (N.Y. App. Div. 1960) (citing Meiselman
v. Crown Heights Hosp., 34 N.E.2d 367 (N.Y. 1941)).
164. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 29.2(a)(1) (2009).
165. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6511 (McKinney 2008).
166. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 54-1814(15) (2008). The Board is also empowered to control physician
licensure. Id. § 54-1806(7).
167. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 61-6-15(D)(24) (LexisNexis 2008).
168. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2990(A) (2005).
169. Id.
170. Robert L. Fine & Thomas Wm. Mayo, Resolution of Futility by Due Process:Early Experience
with the Texas Advance Directives Act, 138 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 743, 743 (2003); Robert D. Truog,
Tackling Medical Futility in Texas, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1, 2 (2007).
171. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.046(a) (2006 & Supp. 2008).
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intervention is inappropriate. 172 These time-limited obligations to patients,
however, emanate from long-standing concerns about surrogate demands that could
harm dying patients, as well as misuse of resources, rather than concerns about
173
physician failure to fulfill the duty of care.
Despite a contractual obligation to the patient, and the possibility of an
abandonment claim, a physician might understandably be reluctant to attend to a
patient if doing so could harm the physician-for example, if the patient were
infected with a highly contagious, potentially lethal virus. Although an
abandonment claim would fail if the physician had provided "reasonable notice"
for the patient to seek an alternate, qualified physician to take over care, 7 4 the
notion of reasonable notice in the extraordinary circumstance of a public health
crisis would not apply as a practical matter if the patient were seriously ill, and
physicians were in short supply or available physicians declined to take over the
patient's care.
Courts have not addressed "personal risk" as a defense to an abandonment
claim, but it is questionable whether such a defense would survive. In contract law,
a "health danger" might be a defense for failure to perform, as long as the danger
was not caused by the nonperforming party, and was unforeseen when the parties
entered into the contract. 17 5 However, any physician whose services involve direct
patient contact would be exposed to health dangers and would enter virtually any
agreement to treat patients with that knowledge. Certain, specialty-specific risks are
common and obviously foreseeable. For example, surgeons, internists, and others
who perform invasive procedures face the possibility of developing serious bloodborne illnesses such as HIV or Hepatitis B or C.176 However, other risks ought to be
anticipated and protective measures taken. In the U.S., transmission of tuberculosis
to health care workers is currently most common when the patient has unsuspected
or undiagnosed disease; 177 thus, for example, a radiologist whose most common

172. Id. § 166.046(e).
173. See, e.g., Council on Ethical & Judicial Affairs, Am. Med. Ass'n, Medical Futility in End-ofLife Care, 281 JAMA 937 (1999); Ethics Comm. of the Soc'y of Critical Care Med., Consensus
Statement of the Society of Critical Care Medicine's Ethics Committee Regarding Futile and Other
Possibly Inadvisable Treatments, 25 CRITICAL CARE MED. 887 (1997); Marshall B. Kapp, Futile
Medical Treatment: A Review of the Ethical Arguments and Legal Holdings, 9 J. GENERAL INTERNAL
MED. 170 (1994); Robert D. Truog et al., The Problem with Futility, 326 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1560
(1992).
174. See Ricks v. Budge, 64 P.2d. 208, 211 (Utah 1937) (requiring "reasonable notice" to avoid a
claim of abandonment).
175. Handicapped Children's Educ. Bd. of Sheboygan County v. Lukaszewski, 332 N.W.2d 774,
777 (Wis. 1983) (citing Jennings v. Lyons, 39 Wis. 553, 557-58 (1876)).
176. Donald E. Fry, Occupational Risks of Blood Exposure in the Operating Room, 73 AM,
SURGEON 637, 637 (2007).
177. Paul A. Jenson et al., Guidelines for Preventing the Transmission of Mycobacterium
Tuberculosis in Health-CareSettings, 2005, MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY REP., Dec. 30, 2005, 1, 2,
available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pdf/rr/rr5417.pdf.
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foreseeable risk is x-ray exposure might nonetheless have contact with such a
patient and would need to anticipate such occurrences.
Clinicians are exposed to other dangers in the health care setting and are
expected to handle them. For example, nursing home residents may be discharged
from the facility involuntarily if they endanger the health or safety of individuals in
the facility, 17 8 but such actions "must be the last resort" used only after the facility
has "exhaust[ed] the options available to it ...
Options could be selected from
an array of pharmacologic or behavioral interventions available to the medical
profession and its various specialties.18 0 Although the federal Nursing Home
Reform Act strongly supports nursing home residents' rights, including the right to
refuse treatments 18 1 and to be free of "physical or chemical restraint,"' 182 the Act
specifically permits their use "to treat a specific condition as diagnosed and
documented in the clinical record .... ,,183 Likewise, physicians are permitted to
administer antipsychotic medications to mentally ill or mentally retarded patients
over their objections if "the patient presents a danger to himself or other members
of society or engages in dangerous or potentially destructive conduct within the
institution .
1...84
In New York State, facilities treating the mentally disabled may
give treatment "at any time to all patients, despite objection in a case where the
treatment appears necessary to avoid serious harm to life or limb of the patients
' 85
themselves or others."'
Legal and regulatory protections are available for infectious disease and other
work-related hazards in the health care environment. The Joint Commission
requires facilities to maintain and furnish personal protective equipment (PPE)
when needed, and to train health care workers in its use.' 8 6 The Occupational
Health and Safety Act 87 and laws in at least twenty-six states18 8 impose similar

178. 42 C.F.R. § 483.12(a)(2)(iii)-(iv) (2008).
179. In re Involuntary Discharge or Transfer of J.S. by Hall, 512 N.W.2d 604, 612 (Minn. Ct. App.
1994).
180. Id.
181. 42 C.F.R. § 483.10(b)(4).
182. Id. § 483.13(a).
183. Id. § 483.25(l)(2)(i).
184. Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337, 343 (N.Y. 1986).
185. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14, § 27.8(b)(1) (2009).
186. JOINT COMM'N, supra note 3, at 3, 8-10.
187. 29 U.S.C. § 652(5) (2006) (applying to employers "engaged in a business affecting commerce
who has employees, but does not include the United States (not including the United States Postal
Service) or any State or political subdivision of a State").
188. U.S. Dep't of Labor, State OccupationalSafety and Health Plans, http://www.osha.gov/dcsp/
osp/index.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2009) (listing twenty-six states with OSHA-approved job safety
and health programs fulfilling requirements that they be "'at least as effective as' comparable federal
standards"). Twenty-two of these programs also apply to employers at government facilities. Id. See,
e.g., N.Y. LAB. LAW § 27-a(4) (McKinney 2002 & Supp. 2009) (relying on OSHA for coverage of
private institutibns); VA. CODE ANN. §40.1-1 (2002).
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requirements on certain health care facilities. Most basic PPE used in hospitals,
such as masks, gowns, and gloves, are intended for use by anyone, including nonemployees, who might be in contact with a patient infected by or vulnerable to
infection with a transmissible infectious agent. 189
Thus, in certain circumstances, the physician's obligation to care for a patient
for whom he has a contractual obligation may persist despite the possibility that the
patient's condition or actions could harm the physician. In fact, physicians have
many tools available to minimize risk when treating patients, and are expected by
the law to exhaust the options in the care of the patient. 19° Tools available to
physicians are not without limit, however. For example, methods exist to prevent
transmission of certain infectious agents between patient and physician, but
prevention of transmission of highly infectious agents, such as influenza virus, and
protection from agents of bioterror are less easily accomplished.' 9'
4. Duty to Carefor People with Disabilities: The Americans with Disabilities
Act, the RehabilitationAct, and the "DirectThreat" Exception
As a general rule, a physician is under no legal obligation to enter into the
physician-patient contract, even in an emergency.1 92 However, federal law
explicitly forbids discrimination on the basis of race, color, and national origin in
programs receiving federal funds,' 93 and discrimination on the basis of disability is
explicitly forbidden under federal law and in many states.194

189. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
GUIDELINES

FOR

ENVIRONMENTAL

INFECTION

CONTROL

IN

HEALTH-CARE

FACILITIES:

RECOMMENDATIONS OF CDC AND THE HEALTHCARE INFECTION CONTROL PRACTICES ADVISORY
COMMITTEE (HICPAC) 26, 36-37 (2003), available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dhqp/pdf/

guidelines/Enviro-guide_03.pdf (mentioning individual recommendations generally as applying to
"health-care workers and visitors").
190. See In re Involuntary Discharge or Transfer of J.S. by Hall, 512 N.W.2d 604, 612 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1994) ("A facility must first exhaust the options available to it within the level of care it is
authorized to provide.").
191. See supra Part III.A.
192. Hiser v. Randolph, 617 P.2d 774, 776 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980) (citing Hurley v. Eddingfield, 59
N.E. 1058, 1058 (Ind. 1901)); Childs v. Weis, 440 S.W.2d 104, 106 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969)) (finding the
physician's contract with the hospital did not create a physician-patient relationship despite the patient's
presence in the hospital and emergency medical condition).
193. 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(a) (2007) (applying to programs administered by the Department of Health
and Human Services); see also, e.g., N.Y. EDuc. LAW § 6509(6) (McKinney 2001 & Supp. 2009)
("Refusing to provide professional service to a person because of such person's race, creed, color, or
national origin" is prohibited and constitutes grounds for discipline under the state's medical licensure
statute).
194. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2006).
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19 5
The federal Rehabilitation Act provides that a recipient of federal funds
"may not, on the basis of handicap deny a qualified person.., benefits or
services," or provide benefits or services that are not as effective as or equal to
those provided to others.' 96 A handicapped person is defined as "any person who
has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more major
life activities, has a record of such an impairment, or is regarded as having such an
impairment.' ' 197 The definition of "physical or mental impairment" includes "any
physiological disorder or condition ...affecting one or more of the body systems,"
including neurological, musculoskeletal, respiratory, cardiovascular, and many
others. 198 The same prohibitions hold under the American with Disabilities Act
(ADA) of 1990, and apply to discrimination regarding benefits and services of a
public entity' 99 or "by any person who owns, leases (or leases to) or operates a
place of public accommodation,"200 which would include, among others, hospitals,
clinics, and physicians offices, 20 1 as well as private entities, such as the professional
office of a health care provider, hospital, or other service establishments if
"operations of such entities affect commerce. 20 2 The ADA definition 2of
04
"disability 2 °3 is equivalent to the Rehabilitation Act definition of "handicap.

Regulatory standards of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act are to be applied similarly
by the courts.205
Thus, the ADA and Rehabilitation Act apply to a broad group of physicians
and institutions. A physician employed by or having a contractual arrangement
with a public facility, or who accepts Medicare or Medicaid payment in his or her
office, would not be excluded from the requirement to provide care for a person
disabled under the Act. That is, the general right to choose whom to treat would not
apply under these circumstances.

195. Lesley v. Chie, 81 F. Supp. 2d 217, 222 (D. Mass. 2000) (citing Glanz v. Vemick, 756 F. Supp.
632, 636 (D. Mass. 1991) (finding that receipt of Medicare or Medicaid funds is considered "federal

financial assistance" under the Rehabilitation Act, 20 U.S.C § 794).
196. 45 C.F.R. § 84.52(a)(1)-(3) (2008).
197. Id. § 84.3(j)(1)(i)-(iii).
198. Id. § 84.30)(2)(i).
199. 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
200. Id. § 12182(a).
201. Bass v. County of Butte, 458 F.3d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 2006) (stating that Disabled Persons Act,
CAL. CIV. CODE § 54(a), expressly provides disabled persons the right to utilize various types of medical
facilities).
202. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F).
203. Id. § 12102(2).
204. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3 (j)(l)(i)-(iii).
205. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 631-32 (1998) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (providing the
authority to promulgate the regulations of the Rehabilitation Act)) (requiring the court to construe the
ADA to grant at least as much protection as provided by the regulations implementing the Rehabilitation
Act).
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Contagious diseases are not excluded from the Rehabilitation Act's definition
of handicapped, °6 and a person disabled by the infectious disease cannot be denied
health care on the basis of the disability unless the individual poses a "direct threat"
to others.2 °7 In Bragdon v. Abbott, a seminal case initiated at the height of the AIDS
epidemic, a dentist's refusal to treat a woman infected with HIV was found to be in
violation of the ADA. 20 8 Abbott's HIV infection was found to be a disability under
the Act on the basis that it interfered with her ability to procreate, a major life
activity. 20 9 The Court found that the dentist could have refused to treat her under
the statute's "direct threat" exception, if, in this case, the infectious condition posed
"a direct threat to the health or safety of others ... that [could] not be eliminated by
a modification of policies, practices, or procedures ....
Because risk to the physician could serve as a defense to a disabilities claim,
it is logical to ask whether the ADA and Rehabilitation Act would apply to people
who have been exposed to a highly contagious, lethal respiratory virus. The same
question would apply to other exposures such as radiological, chemical, or even
nuclear agents. The possibility of discriminatory acts by clinicians would be great,
and might include refusing to treat, or providing unequal treatment-for example
ordering or administering treatment less frequently than needed in order to
minimize exposure to the patient.
The courts have interpreted the ADA definition of "disability" very
stringently. 211 In Toyota v. Williams, 21 2 the Supreme Court considered a case of a
woman who claimed her employer refused to accommodate her manual disability;
the Court held that "to be substantially limited in performing manual tasks," the
impact of her impairment, among other things, "must be permanent or long
term. 21 3 Using this standard, a previously healthy person who developed acute
illness and became temporarily disabled in the common sense of the word, would
not be legally disabled unless, and perhaps not until, he or she developed long-term

206. See Sch. Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987) (regarding
employment of a teacher with recurrent tuberculosis).
207. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3).
208. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 628-29.
209. See id. at 641-42 (affirming lower court's acceptance of Abbott's unchallenged testimony as to
her reasons for not having children on the basis of HIV infection).
210. See id. at 648-49 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3)); see also Abbott v. Bragdon, 163 F.3d 87, 90
(lst Cir. 1998) (finding on remand that appropriate practices were found to exist, and the dentist could
not be excused from treating the patient).
211. See, e.g., Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 187 (2002) (finding that the
proper standard in classifying a disabled individual is to consider whether the individual's afflictions
inhibited one's general performance in carrying out important daily tasks); Sutton v. United Air Lines,
527 U.S. 471, 475 (1999) (holding that mitigating considerations should have been taken into account in
evaluating whether an individual is categorically disabled under the ADA).
212. 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
213. Id. at 198.
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disability from the illness. In the case of pandemic influenza, disabling long term
complications might include chronic pulmonary disease or neuromuscular
derangements, t 4 although these complications could not be predicted in the acute
phase of the illness.21 5
However, in the recently enacted ADA Amendments Act (ADAAA),
Congress rejected a series of high court analyses, including that in Toyota, as
creating a standard of disability "higher than Congress intended, ' 216 and directed
the courts to construe the definition of disability "in favor of broad
coverage ....
,,27 The ADAAA's rejection of the Toyota standard did not refer to
the Court's requirement that the impairment's impact must be "permanent or long
term,, 21 8 stipulating only that such a requirement would be imposed on persons
falling under the "third prong" of the definition of handicapped, namely on
individuals "regarded as" having an impairment whether or not such an impairment
exists. 2 '9 Furthermore, whether a condition constitutes a disability under the law
has to be determined on a case-by-case basis-i.e., whether the condition interferes
with a major life activity. 220 In the case of a communicable disease, the courts,
including Toyota,221 have largely held to individualized assessments of whether
different persons with the same infectious disease satisfied the definition of

214. Simon N. Fletcher et al., Persistent Neuromuscular and Neurophysiologic Abnormalities in
CRITICAL CARE MEDICINE 1012, 1014 (2003)
(reporting long term outcomes in one series of patients with a syndrome of persistent weakness and
neurological deficits commonly seen after prolonged intensive care unit stays); see also Margaret S.
Herridge et al., One-Year Outcomes in Survivors of the Acute Respiratory Distress Syndrome, 348 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 683, 688-89 (2003) (finding that "patients who survived the acute respiratory distress
syndrome have persistent functional limitation one year after their discharge from the [intensive care
unit], largely as a result of muscle wasting and weakness" and that fewer than half had resumed
working).
215. William D. Schweickert & Jesse Hall, ICU-acquired Weakness, 131 CHEST 1541, 1544-45
(2007) (reviewing the literature on syndrome of "ICU-acquired weakness" and noting wide variation in
clinical occurrence of ICU-acquired weakness in patients who survived prolonged treatment in the ICU
setting). See generally Herridge et al., supra note 214, at 691-92 (finding among SARS survivors
patient characteristics and treatments associated with higher risk of developing worse long-term
functional outcomes, although no factor is a precise predictor of outcome).
216. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(b)(4), 122 Stat. 3553, 3554 (2008).
Through enactment of the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Congress rejected the Toyota standard that
"to be substantially limited in performing a major life activity under the ADA" the impairment must be
one that "prevents or severely restricts the individual from doing activities that are of central importance
to most people's daily lives." Id. (citing Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198
(2002)).
217. Id. § 4(a), 122 Stat. at 3555.
218. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 198.
219. ADA Amendments Act § 4(a), 122 Stat. at 3555 (noting that the standards governing such
individuals would not apply to impairments that are minor and having "an actual or expected duration of
[six] months or less").
220. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 483 (1999) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)).
221. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 198 (citing Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 641-42 (1998)).
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disability.222 However, whether the courts would rule that pandemic influenza or
other disaster-related diseases satisfied broadened definitions of disability remains
to be seen.
Certain state antidiscrimination laws define disability more broadly than does
federal law. In California, for example, conditions such as high blood pressure,
which "may handicap in the future but have no present disabling effect," cannot be
excluded as a protected physical handicap within the meaning of the state's Fair
Employment & Housing Act.223 This definition of disability is also applied in
California's Disabilities Act.224 The definition of disability that encompasses
conditions that may handicap in the future has been applied in Maryland, with
226
225
regard to high blood pressure, and in New York, in the case of severe obesity.
It remains to be seen whether a person surviving acutely disabling influenza
but now permanently impaired because of inadequate treatment could claim
discrimination in the health care setting under disabilities law. Under an ADA
claim, a clinician could invoke the "direct threat" exception, citing historical data
about occupationally acquired disease and death during other epidemics, 227 or more
timely data regarding infection and morbidity among health care workers during
the epidemic at issue. Unlike the well-informed guidelines on prevention of HIV
and Hepatitis B and C viruses, 228 uncertainties about prevention and treatment of
highly contagious respiratory viruses, such as influenza,229 would raise particular
concerns in the event of a pandemic with a lethal strain. Serious questions
23 °
regarding use and availability of personal protective equipment for other agents
would make it doubtful that the threat could be eliminated by "a modification of

222. See, e.g., Gowesky v. Singing River Hosp. Sys., 321 F.3d 503, 508 (5th Cir. 2003) (finding
physician with Hepatitis C not disabled for purposes of employment discrimination claim because the
disease did not interfere with her ability to perform alternate work); Furnish v. SVI Sys., 270 F.3d 445,
449 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding Hepatitis B not a disability as the court disagreed with the claimant's
representation of liver function as major life activity). But see Quick v. Tripp, Scott, Conklin, & Smith,
P.A., 43 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1367-68 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (finding Hepatitis C a disability as interfering with
procreation in an otherwise qualified employee able to perform her job).
223. Am. Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 651 P.2d 1151, 1155 (Cal. 1982).
224. CAL. CIV. CODE § 54(a)-(b)(I) (West 2007 & Supp. 2008).
225. Mass Transit Admin. v. Md. Comm'n on Human Relations, 515 A.2d 781, 784 (Md. 1986)
(agreeing with American National Insurance Co. that high blood pressure is potentially handicapping
and therefore the Human Rights Commission could hear the case of man claiming violation of MD.
CODE ANN., art. 49B § 16(a)(l) (1979)).
226. State Div. of Human Rights v. Xerox Corp., 480 N.E.2d 695, 696 (N.Y. 1985) (citing N.Y.
ExEc. LAW § 296(l)(a)).
227. See Huber & Wynia, supra note 107, at W5-W6.
228. See generally Beltrami et al., supra note 125.
229. SIEGEL ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 101, at 20; see also
Balazy et al., supra note 98, at 56; Writing Comm., supra note 94, at 264.
230. See supra Part III.A.
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policies, practices, or procedures ....231In determining whether a patient might
be a direct threat to a treating physician, courts might give "special weight and
authority" to guidelines promulgated by public health authorities,232 but the opinion
of an individual physician is "entitled to deference" even if it deviates from the
general consensus, so long as it rests on a "credible scientific basis ....
,,233
A
clinician, furthermore, need only demonstrate a risk-as opposed to a certainty--of
becoming infected, and could invoke the severity of the risk in bolstering his
argument as well.

234

In the employment context, conditions that last "for only a few days or weeks
and have no permanent or long-term effects on an individual's health" do not rise
to the level of disability. 235 Chronic infections, such as HIV, have been the subject

of disability discrimination claims regarding access to health care236 as well as in
the employment context. 237 However, neither federal nor state courts have been

faced with the question of whether an acutely ill person in the health care setting,
who might or might not recover, is disabled under the law and is protected from
discrimination on the basis of that illness. While it is probable that discrimination
would occur in the case of serious pandemic influenza, it is less probable that an
aggrieved patient could find protection under the ADA, in which case the direct
threat exception would be moot. Moreover, legal options would exist for patients
harmed by inadequate care, as the legal duty of care is broad and would extend to
most if not all venues where seriously ill patients would seek diagnosis and
treatment. 238 However, the possibility would remain that fearful providers could
find other pretexts to avoid exposure, such as claiming lack of skill in treating a
240
239
or, if turning up for work, other rationale.
particular condition,

231. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3) (2006).
232. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 650 (1998).
233. Lesley v. Chie, 250 F.3d 47, 56-57 (1st Cir. 2001) (citing Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 650).
234. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 664 (citing Sch. Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 288
(1987)).
235. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, Section 902 Definition of the Term Disability,
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/902cm.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2009) (mentioning influenza, along
with the common cold, as examples of temporary conditions that do not constitute a disability).
236. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 628-29; Lesley, 250 F.3d at 49; Howe v. Hull, 874 F. Supp. 779, 782
(N.D. Ohio 1994).
237. See, e.g., Lesley, 250 F.3d at 222; Estate of Mauro v. Borgess Medical Ctr., 137 F.3d 398, 400
(6th Cir. 1998); Sch. Bd. of Nassau County, 480 U.S. at 276.
238. See supra Part III.B.3; infra Part III.B.5.
239. Lesley, 250 F.3d at 49, 58.
240. See, e.g., Sharon E. Straus et al., Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome and Its Impact on
Professionalism:Qualitative Study of Physicians'BehaviorDuring an Emerging Healthcare Crisis, 329
BMJ 83, 83 (2004), available at http://www.bmj.conmcgi/reprint/329/7457/83.pdf (while caring for
hospitalized patients during SARS epidemic, physicians described occasional "strained professional
behavior" of colleagues consisting of refusal to assist, making comments such as "I didn't sign up for
this" or "they don't pay me enough to take this kind of risk").
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5. Duty of Care in Emergencies
Although physicians may have an ethical obligation to treat patients in
emergencies, 241 the law is considerably narrower. It has long been held that a
physician is under no obligation to enter into the physician-patient contract, even in
an emergency. 242 "Good Samaritan" laws 243 in two states contain an affirmative
duty to assist in an emergency, with fines for violation." 244 These requirements are
not imposed specifically on physicians, however, and one requirement to give
"reasonable assistance may include obtaining or attempting to obtain aid from law
245
enforcement or medical personnel.
A broader obligation for health professionals is contained in the Emergency
Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA).246 Under EMTALA, a
hospital that accepts Medicare payments and has an emergency department must
screen all persons coming to the emergency department to determine if they have
an emergency medical condition, and if one exists, must either stabilize the medical
condition or transfer the patient to a facility that is willing and able to provide
appropriate treatment. 24 ' The intent of EMTALA was to prevent hospital
emergency rooms from refusing to accept or treat patients with emergency medical
conditions when they are uninsured or unable to pay,248 a practice sometimes
referred to as patient dumping.2 49 EMTALA subjects the physician as well as the
hospital to a civil penalty of up to $50,000 per violation.250 Further, in the case of a
physician, "if the violation is gross and flagrant or is repeated," the penalty may
consist of exclusion from participation in the Medicare and Medicaid programs.251
In state "anti-dumping" laws, requirements may be broader and penalties
more stringent than under EMTALA, which does not preempt state and local
requirements unless they directly conflict.252 In Texas, "reckless violation" of the
nondiscrimination requirement in the provision of emergency services could lead to

241. AMA CODE, supra note 108, at princs. VI, at xv.
242. Hiser v. Randolph, 617 P.2d 774, 776 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980) (citing Hurley v. Eddingfield, 59
N.E. 1058, 1058 (Ind. 1901)); Childs v. Weis, 440 S.W.2d 104, 106-07 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969).
243. See supra Part II.A.3.
244. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (2002) (imposing a fine of up to $100 for willful violation if
aware that another is "exposed to grave physical harm"); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 604A.01, 609.02.4a
(West 2000 & Supp. 2008) (stating that a person violating the requirement to assist at the scene of an
emergency is guilty of a "petty misdemeanor" and thus subject to a fine of up to $300).
245. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604A.01.1 (West 2000 & Supp. 2008).
246. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2008).
247. Id.
248. H.R. REP. No. 99-241, at 27 (1985).
249. Karen I. Treiger, Note, Preventing Patient Dumping: Sharpening the COBRA's Fangs, 61
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1186, 1186-88 (1986).
250. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(1)(A).
251. Id. § 1395dd(d)(1)(B)(ii).
252. Id. § 1395dd(f).
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fines or imprisonment, or both,253 and intentional infraction resulting in a patient's
death could lead to imprisonment of up to 10 years.254 In New York City, the
state's mandate to treat in emergencies may extend to general hospitals without
emergency departments; failure to provide emergency medical care to anyone
needing it, who arrives at the entrance of the hospital, constitutes a misdemeanor. 255
A physician who refuses to treat such a patient is subject to a fine and
imprisonment of up to one year.256 This statute and its sanctions were upheld in the
case of a physician who refused to treat a woman in labor coming to the hospital
where he was on duty.257 Notably, the lower court stated that strict liability statutes
are often "found valid in the areas of public health, safety, and welfare," where:
...the public policy of achieving social betterment through the exercise
of the police power "may require that in the prohibition or punishment
of particular acts it may be provided that he who shall do them shall do
them at his peril and will not be heard to plead in defense good faith or
258
ignorance."
Although some states impose fines for similar infractions,259 for the most part,
penalties in state anti-dumping statutes are unusual, and most do not specify a
cause of action or penalties.26 °
Under EMTALA, an "emergency medical condition" is one that manifests
itself by "acute symptoms of sufficient severity (including severe pain) such that
the absence of immediate medical attention could reasonably be expected" to
jeopardize the patient's health, function, or bodily integrity. 26' A large number of
people, including the "worried well," are likely to present to hospital emergency
rooms during a public health crisis or other disaster, as hospitals are often
253. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 311.022(a), (e) (Vernon 2001); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§§ 12.21-.22 (Vernon 2003).
254. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 311.022(a), (e) (Vernon 2001); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§§ 12.21-22 (Vernon 2003); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.34.
255. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-b(2)(a) (McKinney 2007 & Supp. 2009) (stipulating that
certain highly specialized hospitals could be exempted from this requirement by the Health
Commissioner).
256. Id. § 2805-b(2)(b).
257. People v. Anyakora, 656 N.Y.S.2d 253, 253 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997).
258. People v. Anyakora, 616 N.Y.S.2d 149, 152 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993) (quoting Shevlin-Carpenter
Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57, 70 (1910)) (emphasizing also that the statute applies broadly to "any
licensed medical practitioner," to private as well as public hospitals, and regardless of where at the
hospital the person arrives).
259. See, e.g., 210 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 80/1 to /2 (West 2004) (imposing a fine of $10,000 on a
hospital or person failing to render necessary emergency services).
260. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 19-307.1 (LexisNexis 2005); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 36.62.100 (West 2003); Thomas A. Gionis et al., The Intentional Tort of Patient Dumping: A New
State Cause of Action to Address the Shortcomings of the Federal Emergency Medical Treatment and
Active Labor Act (EMTALA), 52 Am.U. L. REv. 173, 187-90 (2002) (arguing that minimal remedies in
certain states contribute to the continued problem of patient dumping).
261. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(l) (2008).
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perceived as safe havens by the public. 262 Not only would many arrivees satisfy the
EMTALA definition of "emergency medical condition," requiring stabilization by
emergency department staff, but the remainder would at a minimum have to be
given an appropriate screening examination, which would require direct contact
between patient and one or more clinicians, and potential risk exposure. Not to
render care in this circumstance would expose the hospital and responsible staff to
penalties under the law.
Although in-state nonaffiliated clinicians, such as physician volunteers, would
only be required to work if their state had adopted special provisions for public
health emergencies, 263 health professionals volunteering to work at the hospital
would presumably be willing to take the risk of a harmful exposure. The EMTALA
mandate, however, extends to any physician with a contractual relationship with the
hospital, including a physician on call 264 and expected to respond. A physician who
was credentialed by the hospital but not on call would not be required to come to
the hospital under EMTALA, 265 but if he later refused to attend to a patient for
whom he had responsibility he might nonetheless risk liability for abandonment,
loss of hospital credentials, or even sanctions by the state board of medicine for
unprofessional conduct.266
Under EMTALA, a hospital is required to provide care "within the capability
of the hospital's emergency department .. ,,267 In non-disaster situations, hospital
emergency departments that have reached the limit of their ability to care for
patients frequently "go on diversion, 268 instructing emergency medical services to
transport the patient to a hospital that still has capacity and resources. Emergency
medical services are not under any legal requirement to comply with such requests
and might still take the patient to a hospital on diversion if they think it is

262. See, e.g., Madison Park, CNNhealth.com, "Walking Well" Flood Hospitalswith-or WithoutFlu Symptoms (May 2 2009), http://www.cnn.com/2009/HEALTH05/02/worried.well.hospitals/

index.html (noting early in swine flu outbreak that "record numbers" of patients, including the "worried
well," went to emergency rooms, some of which were forced to close down when they could not
accommodate the large numbers).
263. See infra Part II.B.
264. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(1)(B).
265. See KEITH CONOVER, DEP'T OF EMERGENCY MED., MERCY HoSP. OF PITTSBURGH, FEDERAL
LAW AND THE PHYSICIAN 7-8, 21-27 (2003), available at http://www.pitt.edu/-kconover/ftp/emtaladraft.pdf.
266. See infra Parts III.B.2-.3.
267. § 1395dd(a).
268. Catherine W. Burt et al., Analysis of Ambulance Transports and Diversions Among US
Emergency Departments, 47 ANNALS EMERGENCY MED. 317, 317 (2006); Catherine W. Burt & Linda
F. McCraig, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Staffing, Capacity, and Ambulance Diversion in
Emergency Departments: United States, 2003-04, ADVANCE DATA, Sept. 27, 2006, at 1, 6, available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/ad/ad376.pdf.
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necessary-for example, if they believe the patient's condition to be unstable. 69
Taking an unstable patient to a hospital unable to treat the patient promptly might
well place the arriving patient at risk. However, in a declared and activated
emergency, the law specifically provides that hospitals "with dedicated emergency
departments in the emergency area will not, during the emergency period, be
subject to EMTALA sanctions for. . . [r]edirecting individuals seeking [a medical
screening examination] ... or [for] [i]nappropriate transfers arising out of the
T
circumstances of the emergency. 270
An inappropriate transfer would include
failure to "minimize the risks to the individual's health ....
In 2006, there were 118.4 million emergency department visits among 4587
community hospitals in the United States,272 and virtually all of these would have
been covered under EMTALA rules.273 The EMTALA mandate would therefore
appear to have a broad reach. Furthermore, there is no exception to the physician's
duty of care under EMTALA in the case of a patient whose condition poses a risk
to the physician's health.274 Thus, under EMTALA and related state laws,
physicians in hospital emergency departments-and in at least one jurisdiction,
even hospitals without emergency departments-might be obliged to provide care
to patients despite risk to themselves. This risk would be greatly augmented and far
more prevalent during a public health emergency or other disaster.
275
Once a patient is admitted to the hospital, EMTALA rules no longer apply,
but the possibility of recurring or new emergencies in the hospital wards would
269. See, e.g., People v. Anyakora, 616 N.Y.S.2d 149, 151 n.1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993) (noting, in a
case of a physician refusing to treat a woman in labor because the hospital was on diversion, that
ambulances do not have to honor diversion); Policy Statement, N.Y State Dep't of Health Bureau of
Emergency Med. Servs., No. 06-01: Emergency Patient Destinations and Hospital Diversion (Jan. 11,
2006), availableat http://www.health.state.ny.us/nysdoh/ems/pdf/06-01 .pdf.
270. Thomas E. Hamilton, Director, Survey & Certification Group, Ctr. for Medicare & Medicaid
Servs., Waiver of Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA) Sanctions in Hospitals
Located in Areas Covered by a Public Health Emergency Declaration (2007), available at
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/SurveyCertificationGenlnfo/downloads/SCLetterO8-05.pdf (citing 42 C.F.R.
§ 489.24(a)(2) (2006)).
271. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(c)(2)(A) (2006).
272. AM. HOSP. ASS'N, TREND WATCH CHARTBOOK 2008: TRENDs AFFECTING HOSPITALS AND

HEALTH SYSTEMS app. 3, at A-28 tbl.3.3 (2008), available at http://www.aha.org/aha/trendwatch/

chartbook/2008/08appendix3.pdf.
273. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(2) (A "participating hospital" is one "that has entered into a [Medicare]
provider agreement under [42 U.S.C. § 1395cc]"); Lauren A. Dame, The Emergency Medical Treatment
and Active Labor Act: The Anomalous Right to Health Care, 8 HEALTH MATRIX 1, 10 (1998) ("While
[EMTALA] applies only to hospitals that participate in Medicare . . . [,J the protections of the law
include any person who comes to the emergency room, not merely Medicare beneficiaries. In addition,
since almost all of the nation's hospitals are certified to receive Medicare funds, the law's reach is very
broad.").
274. Ariel R. Schwartz, Note, Doubtful Duty: Physicians' Legal Obligation to Treat During an
Epidemic,60 STAN. L. REV. 657, 679 (2007).
275. Bryant v. Adventist Health Sys., 289 F.3d 1162, 1168 (9th Cir. 2002) ("EMTALA's
stabilization requirement ends when an individual is admitted for inpatient care.").
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continue. At that time, the obligation to the patient would apply to virtually any
physician in charge of the care of inpatients, including a private attending physician
who had a previous relationship with the patient, a hospitalist 276 or other physician
with inpatient contractual obligations under a managed care plan, a licensed house
officer in training, and in the case of an unlicensed house officer (and most likely
even a licensed one), the supervising attending physician of record.277
C. Duty of Care in a DeclaredEmergency
1. Mandate to Serve: MSEHPA § 608(a)
The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act (MSEHPA) would confer a
number of extraordinary powers to the governor during a declared public health
emergency.278 Under § 608 of MSEHPA, the public health authority would have
the power "[t]o require in-state health care providers to assist in the performance of
vaccination, treatment, examination, or testing of any individual as a condition of
licensure, authorization, or the ability to continue to function as a health care
provider in th[e] State. 279
At least thirteen states have adopted provisions based on all or part of
§ 608,280 but they vary in key points. South Carolina has adopted all the
requirement and sanctions of § 608.281 In New Jersey, providers would face similar
282
sanctions but only for failures to assist under a specific vaccination program.
Maryland has adopted MSEHPA's § 608 provisions, with additional sanctions
including monetary penalties or imprisonment, or both.283 Although New York did

276. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 904 (28th ed. 2006) (defining a hospitalist as "[a] primary
care physician (not a house officer) who assumes responsibility for the observation and treatment of
hospitalized patients and returns them to the care of their private physicians when they are discharged
from the hospital"); see also Yong-Fang Kuo et al., Growth in the Care of Older Patients by Hospitalists
in the United States, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1102, 1102-03 (2009) (defining hospitalists as "physicians
in general internal medicine who has at least five evalution-and-management billings in a given year and
generated at least 90% of their total evaluation-and-management billings in the year from services to
hospital inpatients" and identifying 120,226 physicians as of 2006 who could be identified as
hospitalists).
277. See,

e.g.,

RHODE

ISLAND

HOSPITAL:

HOUSE

OFFICER'S

CONTRACT,

http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Pediatrics/Residency/Homepage/redesign/contract.pdf

available at

(last visited

Nov. 27, 2009); UNIV. OF CAL. SAN DIEGO MED. CTR., HOUSE OFFICER POLICY AND PROCEDURE

DOCUMENT 2 (2009), available at http://meded.ucsd.edu/assets/6/File/housestaff/HOPPD.pdf.
278. MSEHPA, supranote 4, pmbl., §§ 401,405(a), 803(a), 808; see also supra Part II.B.
279. MSEHPA, supranote 4, § 608(a).
280. See CTR. FOR LAW & PUB.'S HEALTH AT GEORGETOWN & JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVS., supra note
5, at 4 (identifying the states that have adopted aspects of § 608).
281. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-4-570 (Supp. 2008).
282. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:13-23 (West 2007).
283. MD.CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY §§ 14-3A-03, 14-3A-08 (LexisNexis Supp. 2008).
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not adopt MSEHPA provisions, 284 the state's 1951 Defense Emergency Act
provides for very broad powers on the part of the governor and officers of state
agencies, 285 as well as criminal penalties for violations. 286 The law applies to
broadly defined work related to radiological, chemical, bacteriological, or other
biological attack,287 and its provisions would apply to medical personnel.288
Contemporary cases have reaffirmed the statute's broad application in civil
defense. 289 Thus, the possibility of compelling physicians to render care in disasters
is not new, and a legal duty of care could be created under circumstances of great
risk in some jurisdictions.
2. Critique of the Mandate to Serve
Critics of MSEHPA assert that health care providers would be conscripted "to
perform duties that might well violate their Oath to serve patients according to the
best of their own judgment and ability. 29 ° Others have pointed out that health care
providers represent only one of many categories of workers who would be needed
during a public health crisis such as an infectious disease outbreak, and should not
be singled out by the law for "drastic penalties like license revocations or
imprisonment" when others with equally vital roles may refuse to work without
such penalties.29'
Competing obligations, such as the need to care for a child or elderly family
member, might be justified exemptions to the mandate, as would exceptions for
health care providers at enhanced risk, such as pregnant women,292 but MSEHPA

284. CTR. FOR LAW & PUB.'S HEALTH AT GEORGETOWN & JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVS., supra note 5, at
4 (showing that as of July, 15, 2006, MSEHPA § 608 had not been adopted by New York state).
285. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW §§ 9101-9202 (McKinney 2002).
286. Id. § 9181; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 55.10 (McKinney 2004).
287. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 9103. In comparison, the New York State Natural and Man Made
Disaster Act applies to other situations, such as floods, epidemics, radiological accidents, and others,
and provides for broad government powers, including coordination of peacetime emergency response
functions and the civil defense. N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 20 to 29-g (McKinney 2002).
288. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 9103.
289. See, e.g., Daly v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 793 N.Y.S.2d 712, 717-19 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005)
(deciding a case of first impression involving demolition work at the World Trade Center site; holding
that 1951 Defense Emergency Act applies more broadly than nuclear disaster); In re World Trade Ctr.
Disaster Site Litig., 456 F. Supp. 2d 520, 548-49 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (reaffirming contemporary, broad
application of the Act).
290. Jane M. Orient, Ass'n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons, AAPS Analysis: Revised Draft of Model
State Emergency Health Powers Act (Dec. 21) Still a Prescription for Tyranny (Jan. 9, 2002),
http://www.aapsonline.org/testimony/emerpower2.htm.
291. Carl H. Coleman & Andreas Reis, Potential Penaltiesfor Health Care Professionals Who
Refuse to Work Duringa Pandemic, 299 JAMA 1471, 1473 (2008).
292. Denise J. Jamieson et al., Emerging Infections and Pregnancy: West Nile Virus, Monkeypox,
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome, and Bioterrorism, 32 CLINICS IN PERINATOLOGY 765, 766, 773
(2005); Victor R. Suarez & Gary D. V. Hankins, Smallpox and Pregnancy:From EradicatedDisease to
Bioterrorist Threat, 100 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 87, 91-92 (2002); WORLD HEALTH ORG.,

2009]

SERVICE BY HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS

does not provide for such exemptions.293 A health professional who refuses to
cooperate is not entitled, under MSEHPA, to dispute "conscription" through
prospective due process procedures, such as a hearing or the taking of evidence for
purposes of determining if specific circumstances would legitimately prevent him
or her from serving.294 One could argue that such procedures would be impractical
in the exigencies of a disaster, although MSEHPA does provide for notice and
hearing for individuals subject to isolation and quarantine, 295 and those subject to
temporary isolation and quarantine without notice may be released unless the
public health authority petitions the court and shows by a preponderance of the
evidence that such confinement is "reasonably necessary to prevent or limit the
296
transmission of a contagious.., disease to others.,
Despite these concerns, mandating health care providers to respond would
seem justified if it is needed to protect the public's health. In one view, health
professionals have an obligation to confront risk because of their specific ability to
provide care and because they freely chose a profession-with all of its attendant
risk-devoted to care of the ill. 297 Although due process procedures for clinicians
might be impractical to apply prospectively in a public health emergency,
established mechanisms for licensed clinicians facing sanctions exist in all
jurisdictions.298
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(2007), available at http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/WHOCDS EPRGIP_20072c.pdf.
293. Some clinicians might, however, be covered by the federal Family and Medical Leave Act,
which requires employers with atleast fifty employees on the job for at least twelve months to grant
leave for up to "[twelve] work weeks" for purposes of caring for a son, daughter, spouse, or parent with
a "serious health condition." 29 U.S.C. §§ 261 l(4)(A)(i), 2612(a)(1)(C) (2006 & Supp. 2009). Similar
provisions exist in many states. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:11 B-3(e), 34:11B4 (West 2000).
294. See Schwartz, supra note 274, at 687, 690.
295. MSEHPA, supra note 4, § 605(b)(3)-(4).
296. Id. § 605(b)(5).
297. See Chalmers C. Clark, In Harm's Way: AMA Physiciansand the Duty to Treat, 30 J. MED. &
PHILOSOPHY 65, 80 (2005) (discussing the opposing views on physicians' rights and obligations;
summarizing one view that believes that "by freely joining a profession designed to combat disease, one
consents to some standard of risk"); Carl H. Coleman, Beyond the Call of Duty: Compelling Health
Care Professionals to Work During an Influenza Pandemic, 94 IOWA L. REv. 1, 25, 33 (2008)
(discussing the various arguments, including one that suggests "health care professionals have an
inherent obligation to work during infectious-disease outbreaks because they 'assume the risk' of
exposure ... when they voluntarily commit themselves to the healing profession" and one that espouses
an obligation "grounded in the fact that health care professionals have knowledge and special skills"
beyond that of the average individual).
298. ESSENTIALS OF A MODERN MED. PRACTICE ACT § X (Fed'n State Med. Bd. of the U.S. 2006);
Schwartz, supra note 274, at 691, 693; see, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN § 45:9-19.9 (West 2004 & Supp.
2008); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 230 (McKinney 2002 & Supp. 2009).
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Emergency department physicians are those most often subject to EMTALA
requirements,2 99 and would perhaps be the most likely among the medical
specialties to confront risk during an infectious disease outbreak. However, any
clinician who has patient contact could confront such a risk, and many, if not most,
would have a legal obligation to do so, at least in certain circumstances. Such
obligations exist wherever the physician has promised to serve the patient if ablein the hospital, the office, the radiology suite, the nursing home, or at home. To
unilaterally withdraw from the care of a patient to whom a physician has particular
or general obligation would require fulfillment of a duty that might well be
unrealistic in a public health emergency-providing the patient with "reasonable
time" to seek an alternative care provider.
IV. CONCLUSION

A physician's duty of care, within his capabilities, is broad. A physician,
whether a generalist or specialist, may not abandon a patient with whom he has an
established relationship, whether the relationship was established in an outpatient
setting or upon the patient's admission to the hospital. 30 0 He may not refuse contact
with a patient who comes to his hospital's emergency room.30' Such duties would
extend to most if not all venues where patients seriously ill with pandemic
influenza would seek diagnosis and treatment.30 2
Exceptions to these distinct duties of care exist, but cannot be realistically
applied in a public health crisis. There would be insufficient time to seek an
alternative care provider for an established patient who was sick and required care,
or merely needed evaluation. Shortages are great even under ordinary
circumstances, 30 3 and the concept of diversion of patients to other hospital
emergency rooms would be meaningless when the number of patients in urgent
need of evaluation overwhelmed all hospitals in the community.
Mandates similar to MSEHPA would close any remaining gaps in existing
law, by requiring professionals to serve patients without exception for personal
risk. Most physicians have formally pledged to put the patient's welfare first.30 4 For
299. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2006); see generally Laura Brockway, EMTALA: Requirements for Oncall Physicians, THE REPORTER, Nov.-Dec. 2008, at 1; Emtala.com, FAQ on EMTALA,
http://emtala.com/faq.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 2009).
300. See supra Part III.B.3.
301. See supra Part III.B.5.
302. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 292, at 13.
303. CTR. FOR WORKFORCE STUDIES, Ass'N OF AM. MED. COLLEGES, RECENT STUDIES AND
REPORTS ON PHYSICIAN SHORTAGES IN THE U.S. 1 (2009), available at http://www.aamc.org/workforce/
recentworkforcestudies.pdf.
304. Audiey C. Kao & Kayhan P. Parsi, Content Analyses of Oaths Administered at U.S. Medical
Schools in 2000, 79 ACAD. MED. 882, 882-84, 884 tbl.2 (2004) (surveying content of oaths
administered at accredited medical schools and finding that 81% of oaths contain language such as "the
health and life of my patient will be my first consideration").
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those who have not made such an oath, and perhaps even for those who have,3 °5
mandates to serve might impose a requirement to take on a role they never
affirmatively assumed; this in turn would invoke concerns about infringements of
human rights for health professionals as an entire group.3 °6 If infringement of one's
rights can be justified on the basis of ensuring the survival of the community, then
public policy should also dictate that these mandates be balanced by increased
rights for health care professionals at risk. These rights should include guaranteed
health care for those required to serve, guaranteed due process, even if
retrospective, for failure to serve, and enhanced protections against criminal
charges in the extraordinary circumstances of a community-wide disaster. In
addition, any state prepared to require service and impose serious penalties for
failure to comply has a reciprocal obligation to notify any potential conscripts in
advance of a crisis; to provide them with adequate preparedness training, including
education about recognition and treatment of putative agents and effectiveness and
use of various protective methods; and to guarantee access to sufficient protection
307
should they be called up.
In reality, the magnitude of any crisis, coupled with society's preparation for
it, will determine the outcome. Although a physician's special knowledge and skill
might impose a greater duty of care, 30 8 the survival of the community may demand
that this responsibility be shared with others. The legal duty to serve should be
consistent with national accreditation standards for health care institutions, which
recognize the limited ability of hospitals to provide sufficient resources in all
cases. 30 9 The Joint Commission Emergency Management Standards require
hospitals to make plans to function in a catastrophe, while delineating response
procedures that could include curtailing services, closing the hospital to new
patients, or even total evacuation, if such a need arose. 310 This approach thus
31
includes shifting responsibility from the hospital to the population at large. 1
Similarly, the community at large should call upon its members who are willing
and able to serve and prepare them in advance for the shared responsibility of their
own survival.

305. Coleman, supra note 297, at 29 ("An individual who makes ... commitments [in an oath]
would have no reason to believe that she was agreeing to treat patients during an infectious-disease
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